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Having experienced the catastrophic disaster in 2011, Tohoku University has founded the International 
Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS).  Together with collaborating organizations from many 
countries and staff with a broad array of specializations, the IRIDeS conducts world-leading research on 
natural disaster science and disaster mitigation.  Based on the lessons from the 2011 Great East Japan 
(Tohoku) Earthquake and Tsunami disaster, the IRIDeS aims to become a world center for the research/
study of disasters and disaster mitigation, learning from and building upon past lessons in disaster 
management from Japan and others around the world.  Throughout, the IRIDeS should contribute to on-
going recovery/reconstruction efforts in areas affected by the 2011 tsunami, conducting action-oriented 
research and pursuing effective disaster management to build a sustainable and resilient society.
The 3rd United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 will be held on 14-18 March 
2015 in Sendai City, one of the areas seriously damaged due to the 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami.  The 
IRIDeS shall play an important role at the conference as an academic organization located in the hosting 
city.  Drafting of this report, focusing on the 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami in terms of the core indicators 
of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015, is one of the contributory activities to the forthcoming 
event.  
This publication is the final issue after the preliminary published in October 2013, for encouraging the 
discussion, making agreement, and achieving consensus. We hope that the Japanese experience of past 
disasters including the 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami will be shared among national/local governments, 
the private sector, NGO, NPO and citizens all over the world.
Fumihiko Imamura
Director
International Research Institute of Disaster Science
Tohoku University
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Japan has one of the highest levels of urban risk of natural disaster in the world because all the three values 
determining the risk—hazard, vulnerability, and exposed value—are very high. Thus, Japanese society has 
struggled against natural disasters throughout history.
In this context, the UN World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction was held in Yokohama in May 1994 as 
a part of a mid-term review of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). However, the 
most tragically disastrous event in Japanese history since World War II, the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, occurred 
the next year. 
The earthquake led the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) to select Kobe City, 
Hyogo Prefecture, as its location for demonstrating the city’s remarkable recovery from the earthquake. 
The Hyogo Declaration was adopted at the conference, and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 
(HFA) was built as a 10-year plan to safeguard the world from natural hazards. The HFA consists of the 
following five priorities for action, which would serve as guidelines to reduce future disaster damage for 
every country or region.
Priorities for action 2005–2015:
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong 
institutional basis for implementation;
2. Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning;
3. Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience
at all levels;
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors;
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.
During that decade, the Great East Japan Earthquake with Mw 9.0 occurred on March 11, 2011. We 
must learn from such devastating experiences for the sake of future societies.  To this end, International 
Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS), Tohoku University issued “HFA IRIDeS Review 
Preliminary Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake” in October 2013 in terms of HFA 
guidelines from the academic viewpoints of professors at IRIDeS to disseminate the event’s lessons 
learned.  IRIDeS faculties had enriched the report with more cases learnt from the disaster since then. 
This revised report adds more topics to the previous one with additional information of post-disaster urban 
recovery plan announced by municipalities affected by the 2011 Tsunami.  
As well as the preliminary report, each topic deals with a specific case, contains context, the situation 
before and after the event, good practices, and problems, followed by future recommendations 
summarized at the end of the 6th chapter: 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Review.
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2. World's 21st Century Natural Disasters
















1 January 2010 Earthquake Haiti 222,570 3,700,000 8,000 14 August 2003 Heat wave Spain 15,090 880 27 May-August 2010 Flood China 1,691 134,000,000 18,000 39 May-June 2004 Flood Dominican Republic 688 10,002
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4 May 2008 Earthquake China 87,476 45,976,596 85,000 17 November 2013 Storm Philippines 7,986 16,106,807 10,000 30 August 2003 Heat wave Belgium 1,175 42 August 2007 Earthquake Peru 593 658,331 600
5 October 2005 Earthquake Pakistan 73,338 5,128,309 5,200 18 June 2013 Flood India 6,054 504,473 1,100 31 July 2003 Heat wave Switzerland 1,039 280 43 February 2010 Earthquake Chile 562 2,671,556 30,000 
6 June-August 2010 Heat wave Russia 55,736 
 400 19 May 2006 Earthquake Indonesia 5,778 3,177,923 3,100 32 July 2006 Heat wave Netherlands 1,000  44 April-June 2013 Heat Wave India 557
7 December 2004 Earthquake Sri Lanka 35,399 1,019,306 1,317 20 April 2010 Earthquake China 2,968 112,000 500 33 November 2001 Flood Algeria 921 45,423 300 45 February 2002 Drought Malawi 500 2,829,435
8 December 2003 Earthquake Iran 26,796 267,628 500 21 September 2004 Storm Haiti 2,754 315,594 50 34 January 2011 Flood Brazil 900 45,000 1,000 46 July 2007 Heat wave Hungary 500
9 July-August 2003 Heat wave Italy 20,089 4,400 22 August 2003 Heat wave Portugal 2,696 35 January 2001 Earthquake El Salvador 844 1,334,529 1,500 47 August 2006 Flood Ethiopia 498 10,096 3
10 January 2001 Earthquake India 20,005 6,321,812 2,623 23 May-June 2004 Flood Haiti 2,665 31,283  36 January-February 2006
Extreme winter
Conditions Ukraine 801 59,600 48
April 2010-March 
2011 Flood Colombia 418 2,791,999 1,000
11 March 2011 Earthquake Japan 19,846 368,820 210,000 24 May 2003 Earthquake Algeria 2,266 210,261 5,000 37 July 2003 Heat wave Croatia 788 49 September 2013 Earthquake Pakistan 399 185,749 100
12 August 2003 Heat wave France 19,490 4,400 25 December 2012 Storm Philippines 1,901 6,246,664 1,693 38 July 2013 Heat Wave UnitedKingdom 760 50
August-September 
2006 Flood Ethiopia 364 8,000 





























This map indicates the fifty worst disasters 
between 2001 and April 2014. These 
disasters are categorized into five types.
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Data Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, Centre for  Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters  (CRED)
(Source:  NOAA)
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3. History of Natural Disasters in Japan (1888 - 2010)
Japan is located in one of the most disaster-
prone areas in the world, and we Japanese 
have experienced many disastrous events 
throughout history.  Thus Japanese society 
and cities are skilled at disaster management. 
Each disaster has helped develop and 
strengthen our disaster management system. 
Although we occasionally experience 
catastrophic disasters, the number of 
deaths and missing persons due to disasters 
has been declining as a result of gradual 
improvement of the various aspects of our 
disaster management system.
This map displays the distribution of major 
disasters in Japan from 1888 to 2010.  About 
sixty disasters are classified into four types: 
earthquake or tsunami, volcanic disaster, 
windstorm or flood, and heavy snowfall.  
1946 Nankai Earthquake (M8.0) : 1,443
→ 1947 • Disaster Relief Act
1948 Fukui Earthquake (M7.1) : 3,769
→ 1950 • Building Standard Law
1973 Mt. Sakurajima Eruption : —
→ 1973 • Act on Specia Measures for Active Volcanoes
1999 Torrential Rains in Hiroshima
→ 2000 • Act on Promotion of Sediment Disaster
    Countermeasures for Sediment Disaster Prone Areas
2000 Torrential Rains in the Tokai Region : 10  
→ 2003 • Specified Urban River Inundation  
               Countermeasures Act
Nobi Earthquake (M7.9) : 7,2731891
Typhoon Muroto : 3,0361934
Torrential Rains : 9251938
Typhoon Makurazaki : 3,7561945
1947 Mt. Asama Eruption : 11
Typhoon Jane : 5391950
Typhoon Ruth : 9431951
Typhoon Toyamaru : 1,7611954
Torrential Rains : 7221957
Mt. Aso Eruption : 121958
Typhoons 23, 24, 25 : 1811965
Typhoons 24,26 : 3171966
Torrential Rains : 2561967
Typhoon 17 and Torrential Rains : 1711976
Heavy Snowfall : 1011977
1977 Mt. Usu Eruption : 3
1979
Kita-Tango Earthquake (M7.5) : 2,9251927
Heavy Snowfall : 1521980
Nihon-kai-chubu Earthquake (M7.7) : 1041983
Torrential Rains : 1171983
Heavy Snowfall : 1311983
Nagano-ken-seibu Earthquake (M6.8) : 291984
1990 Mt. Unzen Eruption : 44
Hokkaido-nansei-oki Earthquake (M7.8) : 2301993
1993
2000 Mt. Usu Eruption : —
Typhoon 23 : 982004
Heavy Snowfall : 1522005
Heavy Snowfall : 2311963
Typhoon 20 : 115
Niigata-ken-Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (M6.8) :152007
1943 Tottori Earthquake (M7.2) : 1,083
Heavy Snowfall : 1312010
Torrential Rains : 79
Torrential Rains : 4471972
Torrential Rains : 1,0131953
1914 Mt. Sakurajima Eruption : 58
Storm damage : 6701954
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Data Source: “Disaster Management in Japan” (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2011)
→ 1995 • Act on Special Measures for   
                Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures
              • Act on Promotion of the Earthwuake-proof 
                Retrofit of Buildings
              • Amendment of Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
              • Amendment of Act on Special Measures 
                for Large-scale Earthquakes
→ 1996 • Act on Special Measures for Preservation of 
                Rights and Profits of the Victims of Specified Disasters
→ 1997 • Act on Promotion of Disaster Resilience Improvement 
                in Densely Inhabited Areas
→ 1998 • Act on Support for Livelihood Recovery of 
               Disaster Victims
→ 2005 • Amendment of Act on Promotion of the 
                Earthquake-proof Retrofit of Buildings
            • Amendment of Flood Control Act
            • Amendment of Act on Promotion of Sediment Disaster 
                Countermeasures for Sediment Disaster Prone Areas
1964 Niigata Earthquake (M7.5) : 26
→ 1966 • Act on Earthquake Insurance Insurance
1978 Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake (M7.4) : 28








Meiji Sanriku Earthquake Tsunami (M7.1) : 21,9591896
Great Kanto Earthquake (M7.9) :1923
Mt. Tokachi Eruption : 1441926
Showa Sanriku Earthquake Tsunami (M8.3) : 3,0641933
Mikawa Earthquake (M6.8) : 2,3061945
Typhoon Kathleen : 1,9301947
1948
Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M8.2) : 331952
Torrential Rains : 1,1241953
Typhoon Kanogawa : 1,2691958
Typhoon Ise-wan : 5,0981959
Tonankai Earthquake (M7.9) : 1,2231944
Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M7.9) : 521968
Izu-hanto-oki Earthquake (M6.9) : 301974
Izu-Oshima-kinkai Earthquake (M7.0) : 251978
Torrential Rains and Typhoon 10 : 4391982
Miyake Is. Eruption : —1983
Izu-Oshima Is. Eruption : —1986
Miyake Is. Eruption and Niijima and Kozushima Is. Earthquake : 12000
Deaths and Missing Persons by Disasters (1945 - 2010)
Earthquake (epicenters marked), Tsunami
Volcanic disaster
Windstorm (landed places marked), Flood
Heavy snowfall
(places with highest seasonal total marked)
Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake  (M7.2) : 232008
→ 1960 • Soil Conservation and Flood Control   
                Urgent Measures Act
→ 1961 • Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
→ 1962 • Act on Special Financial Support
                to Deal with Extremely Severe Disasters
Chile Earthquake Tsunami (M9.5) : 1421960
Disaster (Magnitude) : Year Number ofDeaths and Missing
approx. 
105,000
Mt. Bandai Eruption : 461
Typhoon Ion : 838
 (M6.8) : 67
 (M7.3) : 6,437
(Image from Wikimedia Commons)
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Data Source: Fire and Disaster Management Agency, (as of March 26, 2013)
4. Damage due to
        2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
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Hakodate City 1              0
Erimo Town 0              1
Sanami Town 0             3
Misawa City 2              41
Oirase Town 0              69
Hachinohe City 2             878

























































  38°   6'12'' N, 142°51'36'' E
  Magnitude 9.0
  Depth of hypocenter: 24km
 2011-03-11 14:46
 (2011-03-11 05:46 UTC)
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5. Various Post-tsunami Recovery Plans for the Coastal Areas 
     affected by 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami








HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
14
Data Source:
▪Fire and Disaster Management Agency (as of March 26, 2013)
▪Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT,) 
 Housing Bureau (as of April 1, 2013)
▪Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT,) 
 City Bureau, “Archive of Recovery Support Survey”Data
▪Reconstruction Agency (as of August 12, 2013)
▪Municipalities’ Websites
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6. 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Review
HFA Priority for Action 1:
and vice ministers are responsible for the section, and the 
Director-General and the staff of this section draw up basic 
disaster management policies in response to large-scale 
disasters by coordinating with ministries relevant to disaster 
management.1
  
National ministries in charge of disaster management have 
prepared countermeasures for disasters based on various 
acts that they hold jurisdiction over.
Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority 
with a strong institutional basis for implementation.
Keywords:
institutional structure, disaster management acts, disaster 
management plans
Context:
Japan’s national institutional and legislative frameworks 
for disaster management, originating in the 1880s, are well 
developed and have been refined after each large-scale 
disaster, in order to function at all national, regional, and 
local levels. The current disaster management framework 
is specified by the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act 
of 1961, enacted after Typhoon Isewan in 1951, which 
caused severe damage. In the wake of the Great East 
Japan Earthquake (hereinafter GEJE) in 2011, new laws 
and amend laws have been enacted to introduce a new 
countermeasure framework against major earthquakes and 
other serious incidents to ensure the resiliency of Japan.
Institutional structure 1: Key national players for disaster 
management: Central Disaster Management Council, 
Cabinet Office and national ministries
Before:
A basic disaster management system was introduced at the 
national level in 1961, and several national key players 
have taken central roles since then. The Central Disaster 
Management Council (established in 1962) discusses, 
evaluates and decides upon crucial disaster management 
policy. The Prime Minister chairs the council, and its 
members include all cabinet ministers (representing all 
ministries and agencies), four heads of important public 
organizations and four disaster management experts. 
This council has Committees for Technical Investigation, 
which investigate topics that require further research and 
assessment for scientific and administrative inputs (Table 
1.1)
The Disaster Management Section of the Cabinet Office 
centrally manages coordination and collaboration among 
ministries and other relevant national organizations, and 
is in charge of the secretariat of the Central Disaster 
Management Council. A cabinet minister, deputy ministers 
After:
The devastation wrought by the GEJE in the Tohoku 
region on March 11, 2011, led to the creation of a new 
reconstruction agency (See Figure 1.1). The Reconstruction 
Agency officially debuted on February 10, 2012, following 
the previous Headquarters of Reconstruction, which was set 
up in June 2011. The Reconstruction Agency was created 
under the Act Establishing the Reconstruction Agency and 
is planned to operate for 10 years. This agency is primarily 
responsible for coordinating various ministries’ budgetary 
and reconstruction procedures so that reconstruction efforts 
in all localities can proceed in a timely manner.





















Secretariat Disaster Management Section of Cabinet 
Office
Committees for Technical Investigation
Source: recreated from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, available at: 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/fukkou/organization/reconstructiongrant.html
Fig. 1.1 Role of the National Reconstruction Agency 
1   Ministries of Internal Affairs and Communications; Justice; Foreign Affairs; Finance; Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Health, labor and Welfare;  
    Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Economy, Trade and Industry; Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; Environment; and Defense.
Table 1.1 Organization of the Central Disaster Management Council
HFA Core Indicator 1.1:
National policy and legal frameworks for disaster 
risk reduction exist and include decentralized 
responsibilities and capacities at all levels.
National Policy and Legal 




The Central Disaster Management Council created some 
committees for technical investigation following the 
GEJE. In April 2011, a committee on earthquake and 
tsunami countermeasures was set up to scientifically 
assess and integrate the lessons learned from the GEJE. 
Later in October of the same year, the Committee for 
Policy Planning on Disaster Management was established, 
followed by two new working groups for detailed analysis 
of countermeasures for the Nankai Trough Earthquake and 
Tokyo Inland Earthquakes. After the final reports by these 
committees were published, the Committee for Execution 
of Disaster Management Policy was established in March 
2013.
Institutional structure 2: Managing disasters with plans
Before:
Disaster management plans are basic tools for disaster 
preparedness in Japan. There are three types of such plans 
based on the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act: 1) Basic 
Disaster Management Plan of the central government, 
2) Disaster Management Operation Plans of ministries 
and quasi-governmental agencies, and 3) Local Disaster 
Management Plans of prefectures and municipalities. Plan 
1) was first adopted in 1963 and has since been guiding the 
country’s disaster management. Plans 2) and 3) are drawn 
up based on the content of plan 1). These plans cover three 
disaster phases: i) mitigation and preparation, ii) response 
and iii) recovery and reconstruction, and are organized by 
disaster type, for example, earthquake, winds and floods, 
volcanoes, and snowstorms in the natural disaster category. 
Their content is revised as needed, and revisions have been 
more frequent in recent years.
After:
The first revision after the GEJE in the Basic Disaster 
Management Plan was the response to a large-scale 
tsunami. Previously, the response to tsunamis had not been 
emphasized enough and was included in the chapter on 
earthquakes in this plan. Furthermore, several fundamental 
revisions of the plan have been executed to reflect additional 
countermeasures, prescribe new acts and amend acts. Plans 
2) and 3) have also been revised accordingly.
Legislative structure: Disaster Management Acts
Before:
Since the Disaster Relief Act of 1947, one of the oldest 
disaster-related acts in modern legislation, Japan has passed 
various laws and acts on the management of and response 
to disasters. The content of these laws varies depending on 
the targets. The Flood Control Act (1949) and the Building 
Standards Act (1950) were drawn up to reduce damage 
from floods and earthquakes and/or fires, respectively. The 
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (1961) established 
the present framework of Japanese disaster management. It 
was drastically revised based on the lessons learned from 
the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. More recently, 
the Act on Support for Reconstructing the Livelihoods of 
Disaster Victims (1998) was established to secure the basic 
livelihoods of families affected by disasters.
After:
After the GEJE, the Japanese government actively 
established the new acts and amended existing acts. 
- Two new acts for tsunami disaster management (June and 
  December 2011)
- A revision of the Act on Special Measures concerning 
  Urban Regeneration (April 2012)
- A revision of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (June 
  2012 and June 2013)
- A new act concerning the reconstruction from major 
  disasters (June 2013)
- A new act of countermeasures for the Tokyo Inland 
  Earthquake (November 2013)
-A fundamental revision of an act for promotion of 
  countermeasures for the Nankai Trough Earthquake 
  (November 2013)
- A new basic act of national resilience for disaster 
  management and mitigation (December 2013)
All of these acts were drafted by utilizing the precious 
lessons learned from the GEJE, and enacted to prepare for 
major disasters predicted to affect Japan in the near future.
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After:
After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, hospitalized 
patients who could not be evacuated easily were left 
behind in an area within a 20 km radius of the nuclear 
plant. On March 13, 2011, the Cabinet Office ordered 
the local government to assist with the evacuation of the 
hospitals inside the Restricted Area. In a situation where 
communication was limited and sufficient information could 
not be obtained, the evacuation of hospitalized patients was 
extremely difficult, resulting in at least 60 deaths by the end 
of March 2011 2.
Good practices:
There are seven hospitals within the 20 km radius around 
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. At the time of 
the accident, approximately 850 patients were hospitalized 
at these seven hospitals. Among these patients, about 
400 were seriously ill. Futaba Hospital was one of these 
hospitals, and is located within a 5 km radius of the nuclear 
plant. In the case of Futaba Hospital, slightly ill hospitalized 
patients were transported out of the hospital on March 12, 
2011. Seriously ill patients were left in the hospital, and 
there was no assistance for the seriously ill patients from the 
town office. Japan Self-Defense Forces and the local police 
arrived at the Futaba Hospital on March 14 and 15, and they 
transported the patients to the Sousou Healthcare Center, 
which was where surface contamination measurements of 
the evacuees were conducted at that time 2 (Fig. 1.2).
Problems:
Before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, it was 
assumed that the possibility of a severe accident was 
extremely low and that complex disasters were highly 
unlikely. The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) was 
established in 2012 to learn lessons from the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear disaster. The NRA postulates tremendous 
natural disasters, intentional airplane crashes and terrorist 
attacks. In order for regulations to reflect the lessons learned 
from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and other 
international nuclear accidents, organizational independence 
of the NRA is important.
Fig. 1.2 Surface contamination measurements at the Sousou 
Healthcare Center on March 14, 2011
HFA Core Indicator 1.1:
National policy and legal frameworks for disaster 
risk reduction exist and include decentralized 
responsibilities and capacities at all levels.
Evacuation System for “Persons with 
Special Needs*” in Nuclear Disasters
*Elderly, Infants, Expectant and Nursing Mothers, 
Injured or Sick Persons, Persons (Children) with 
Disabilities, and Foreign Nationals, etc.
2
Keywords:
nuclear disasters, person requiring support under disaster 
situation, evacuation, hospitalized patients, Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear disaster
Context:
The current Emergency Preparedness Guide was established 
in 1980 after the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 
the US. Revisions were made after the Tokaimura nuclear 
accident. However, a drastic review of the Emergency 
Preparedness Guide was not carried out after the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster because of the belief that a Chernobyl-
type nuclear accident could not occur in Japan. After the 
occurrence of the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake 
in 2007, many local governments hosting nuclear power 
plants requested that the national government prepare for 
complex disasters (including situations where a nuclear 
power plant could be affected by a large-scale natural 
disaster). However, the Guide was not revised drastically 
after the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake on the 
assumption that severe nuclear accidents could never occur 
in principle since extremely stringent safety examinations 
were conducted during the design phase of nuclear power 
plant construction, and because local residents should not 
be misled or confused 2.
Before:
The Prefecture Regional Disaster Prevention Plan stipulates 
that the evacuation of hospitalized patients shall basically 
be implemented by the hospitals on their own. Evacuations 
of entire hospitals were not expected before the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear disaster.
2   Main report. The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. 2012.18
HFA Core Indicator 1.2:
Dedicated and adequate resources are available 
to implement disaster risk reduction activities at 
all administrative levels.
Dedicated and Adequate Resources 
for Disaster Management in Japan
3
Keywords:
budgetary resources, human resources, informational 
resources
Context:
Japan is a unique country in that it invests ample 
resources in disaster management. The budget for 
disaster management is annually secured, and abundant 
supplemental budgets have been provided for rebuilding 
in the aftermath of the GEJE disaster. Additionally, given 
that Japan is aging and losing population, new forms of 
collaboration have been emerging to secure adequate 
human resources from the decreasing pool to fill the gap. 
Such collaboration efforts have accelerated further after 
the GEJE. Disaster white papers since 1963 are another 
form of useful resource for the national, regional, and local 
administrations, as well as private citizens.
Budgetary resources
Before:
Although the proportion of the budget allocated for disaster 
management in the general account budget was decreasing 
prior to the GEJE, from 8% in 1997 to 3.5% in 2010, 1.24 
trillion yen were appropriated for disaster management in 
20103. In addition, abundant supplemental budgets have 
often been provided for rebuilding public infrastructures 
after significant disasters. 
After:
The GEJE’s direct economic damage is calculated as 16.9 
trillion yen. As of July 2013, budgets for rebuilding post-




Inter-prefecture and -locality partnerships for mutual 
help, including objectives to share human resources, have 
been encouraged since 1995. Such partnerships have 
largely involved exchanging agreements. More recently, 
as a goal of decentralized governance, the Kansai Large-
Area Coalition (Kansai Koiki Rengo) was formed on 
October 27, 2010, the first such organization in modern 
government administrations. This coalition comprises seven 
participating prefectures of the Kansai region. One of the 
seven administrative goals of this coalition is to establish a 
large-area disaster management system so that participating 
prefectures can provide or receive support for emergencies 
After:
For the first time in disaster management history, the large-
area administrative coalition is supporting the affected large-
area regions. As part of the “counterpart system approach,” 
Osaka and Wakayama Prefectures partner with Iwate; 
Hyogo, Tottori, and Tokushima partner with Miyagi; and 
Shiga and Kyoto partner with Fukushima, each partnership 
including the dispatching of volunteers and specialists for 
short-term response and long-term rebuilding (Fig. 1.3). As 
of August 30, 2013, 136,000 man days in total have been 
dispatched. Additionally, the prefectures temporarily host 
evacuees from other prefectures5.
Informational resources
Since 1963, the Cabinet has published an annual disaster 
white paper structured to report significant disaster data 
for damages, responses, and changes affecting disaster 
management. This paper is a useful resource for national, 
regional, and local administrations as it reports the relevant 
statistics on disasters and their management, budget, and 
related laws and institutions. Administrations refer this 
paper for updating disaster management plans that they need 
to review annually. Since the GEJE, statistics and revised 
laws and regulations have been updated annually.
Source: http://blog.kahoku.co.jp/saisei/2012/03/post-33.html
Fig. 1.3: Counterpart Support by the Kansai Large-area Coalition
3   Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2011. “Disaster Management in Japan.”
4  Reconstruction Agency, 2013. “Reconstruction progress and issues.”
5  Kansai Large-Area Coalition. “Response of Kansai Large-Area Coalition on the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011. Retrieved September 3, 2013, from
   http://www.kouiki-kansai.jp/contents.php?id=219.
resulting from disasters beyond their own control. This 
coalition also strives to secure sufficient human and other 
resources for potential disasters.
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After:
National government supported the formulation of recovery 
plans for the affected municipalities in the first year after 
the disaster by organizing planning committees comprising 
prefectural and national government bureaucrats, 
consultants and individuals from the academic community. 
The Ishinomaki City government uniquely organized a 
recovery planning conference regularly from the second 
year; the chairman of which was a university professor. 
Four working groups, which were reorganized into three 
one year later, were organized under this council to change 
information, adjust each project and to share a common 
recognition of problems (Fig.1.4). Faculty members of the 
universities also support the reconstruction activities at the 
community level.
Good practices:
-  Experts in architecture, civil engineering and urban 
   planning working together as a team exceed the 
   framework of their specialized field.
-  Local governments and experts forge a long-term 
   relationship with each other, which makes it possible to 
   engage in a frank exchange of views.
-  The experts contribute to consensus building in the local 
   community through technical support.
-  The experts function as an intermediary between the city 
   administration and the local community.
Problems:
-  Some of the advice was not accepted by the local 
   government because it was impractical or because of 
   limited administrative capacity.
-  Similar cooperation between the local governments and 
   faculty members is not widely observed in other regions.
Fig. 1.4 Role of university teachers in the public and private sectors
HFA Core Indicator 1.2:
Dedicated and adequate resources are available 
to implement disaster risk reduction activities at 
all administrative levels.
University Faculty as a Non-
Governmental Resource to 
Support Disaster Risk Reduction 




planning aid, recovery planning, university teacher, 
community, local government
Context:
One of the characteristics of the Great East Japan 
Earthquake is that the damage caused by it and the 
following tsunami was overwhelmingly beyond the 
response capabilities of the affected local governments, 
which should be in charge of recovery planning, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Moreover, most of the local 
communities in the affected areas did not have sufficient 
experience in community planning for both hard and soft 
aspects. It was, therefore, expected that experts should 
support these planning activities.
Before:
Local governments were to formulate their own recovery 
plan by themselves because of the decentralization of power. 
However, it was very hard for them to do so by themselves 
because of a lack of experience. Local communities also 
faced a similar problem.
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HFA Core Indicator 1.3:
Community participation and decentralization 
are ensured by delegating authority and 
resources to local levels.
Community Participation in Japan5
Keywords:
voluntary community organization, business communities
Context:
Japan has a long history of community participation in 
disaster reduction activities. The notions of “self-help,” 
“mutual-help,” and “public-help” have been widely shared, 
especially after the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake. The 
voluntary community organization for disaster management, 
represented by firefighting activities, is considered 
especially important for self-help and mutual help actions. 
Business communities have also begun preparing business 
continuity plans since 2005, when the Central Disaster 
Management Council prepared a guideline on this topic. 
Voluntary community organization for disaster 
management
Before:
Voluntary community organizations for disaster management 
are regulated in the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act of 
1961, number 5, article 2. According to the statistics of the 
Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 139,000 voluntary 
community organizations existed in 1,658 localities in 2009, 
and their activities covered 73.5% of all households across 
the nation6. 
After:
Various communities that were significantly affected by the 
GEJE and had practiced their volunteer activities during 
normal periods in preparation for emergency response found 
their preparedness functional and effective. For example, 
creating a list of the population needing help (handicapped 
and elderly) was useful when evacuating them. Rules 
adopted prior to the GEJE to inform the community about 
individuals’ safety during significant disasters have also 
helped community members to identify those who were 
missing. Nevertheless, various issues emerged: for example, 
in the relationship between local governments and voluntary 
community organizations, some were unofficial and inhibited 
direct work, such as when goods and supplies for temporary 
evacuees were available only to those in designated 
evacuation shelters, whereas, in reality, evacuation shelters 
existed in many other places as demand was high after the 
GEJE’s unexpected size7. Currently, many activities led by 
voluntary community organizations are being reviewed and 
assessed for better operations in the future. 
Business communities preparing for disaster
Before:
The Special Committee of the Central Disaster Management 
Council in 2005 developed and began promoting Business 
Continuity Plans (BCPs), which enable private corporations 
to prepare for disasters to mitigate damages and to continue 
operations during the response and recovery stage. 
Targeting large and medium enterprises in particular, this 
effort was expected to enable sustained business operations 
even in emergencies.
After:
The business community has researched the effectiveness of 
BCPs during and immediately after the GEJE. According to 
web-based research led by NTT data (the national telecom 
company)8, 44.7% of corporations either had or were 
developing a BCP when the GEJE struck, among which 
45% of large corporations already had BCPs. Regarding 
BCP operation, 65.7% of 263 corporations reported that 
the BCP either had problems in functioning, partially or 
completely, with the GEJE’s impact to the global supply 
chain, which extended beyond the size of “expected” 
disasters. A complete review is currently on-going in 
business communities to revise the contents of BCPs to 
operate more efficiently in future disasters. 
6  Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2009. “Chapter 4 Disaster management activities by self-help and regional resilience creation to disasters.” Firefighting White Paper, 
   retrieved September 29, 2013, from http://www.fdma.go.jp/html/hakusho/h21/h21/index2.html#dai4.
7  Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2009. “Chapter 4 Disaster management activities by self-help and regional resilience to disasters.” Firefighting White Paper. 
   Retrieved September 29, 2013, from http://www.fdma.go.jp/html/hakusho/h21/h21/index2.html#dai4.
8  Ohashi, K., 2011. “How do we reflect lessons learned from the earthquake? Findings from the survey results of business continuity by corporations affected by the GEJE.” 
   Retrieved September 29, 2013, from http://www.keieiken.co.jp/monthly/2011/1109-04/index.html. 21
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Fig. 1.5 Volunteers Camping in a School Field, Six Months after the GEJE
9  Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2007. “Enhancing mutual-supporting system between municipalities.” Retrieved August 28, 2013,from
   http://www.fdma.go.jp/neuter/about/shingi_kento/h24/tikoutai/01/shiryo_02.pdf.
10  National Institute for Educational Policy Research, 2012. Activities by NPOs and volunteers following the Great East Japan Earthquake. Retrieved on September 28, 2013, from 
   http://www.nier.go.jp/jissen/chosa/rejime/2011/02_npo_vol/05_chapter3.pdf.
11  Fukumoto, H., 2013. Supporting affected areas by municipalities during emergency – assessing effectiveness of inter-governmental mutual-support agreements –.
Keywords:
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, volunteer activities, 
wide-area response and mutual support between 
municipalities
Context:
Japan’s multi-sector platform for disaster risk reduction is 
functioning under the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic 
Act. However, the GEJE and Tsunami have proven that 
there is no perfect system resilient to all types and sizes of 
disaster, regardless of how well the platform is established 
and operated. The national government response was limited, 
incapable of quickly responding to the needs of the affected 
local government as it was difficult for them to investigate the 
overall damage. Meanwhile, having a multi-sector platform 
has also proven that support from non-structured segments, 
such as volunteer efforts, could be quite useful. The platform 
then incorporates these lessons via modification of the 
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, in order to improve 
response capacity against future mega-disasters.
Before:
Under the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, 
the national government, local governments, Japan Red 
Cross, other key semi-governmental and humanitarian 
organizations and communities were prepared to function 
under emergency conditions throughout the response stage. 
The Act was significantly revised to further strengthen 
functions of emergency response headquarters and traffic 
regulations for better emergency management after the 
1995 earthquake. At this time, the word “volunteer” was 
first included in the Act and in national law. Since 2005, 
the Cabinet office has established the Committee for 
Disaster-related Volunteer Activities to encourage citizens’ 
greater participation in disaster reduction activities. 
Various committees were established and meetings held in 
several cities nationwide, including topics related to wide-
area response and networking on disaster management. 
Encouragement to reach agreements on mutual support 
during emergencies between neighboring local governments 
has increased during this period, and in 2010, 90% of local 
governments across Japan had reached such agreements9. 
Problems:
Although local governments are technically mandated to act 
centrally for disaster response and management, prefectural 
and national governments are also required to step in and 
take the lead in responding to mega-disasters like the GEJE 
by creating emergency headquarters in their administrations.
Nevertheless, because of the size and complexity of the GEJE 
and Tsunami, national and prefectural government provision 
of the necessary support to local governments was delayed 
because local governments’ help requests encountered 
complications resulting from the devastating damage to the 
usual means of reaching the national government.
Good practices:
Despite the initial difficulties in reaching the affected areas 
because of an insufficient volume of damage information 
and avoiding secondary disasters, numerous volunteers and 
organizations, including international and domestic NGOs, 
NPOs, and student groups, joined in to provide support in 
the affected areas (see Fig. 1.5 for volunteer participation 
six months later in Ishinomaki City). So far, 936,900 people 
in total have volunteered to support the affected region 
within the two years after the GEJE10. Furthermore, various 
inter-governmental agreements have effectively supported 
the affected region by, for example, hosting disaster-
affected populations who lost their houses in disasters.
After:
In  r e sponse  to  the  GEJE d i sas t e r,  t he  Disas t e r 
Countermeasures Basic Act was amended, effective April 
12, 2013. Major revisions include i) strengthening response 
capacity for large-scale disasters; ii) providing residents 
with smooth and safe evacuation routes; iii) improving 
response capacity, and iv) enhancing learning of disaster 
management procedures in normal periods— all of which 
emphasize improvement in response to large-scale disasters. 
Another major focus for change has been public volunteer 
coalitions for better response capacity for mega-disasters. 
A unit called the “Coalition Group of Volunteers and 
Corporations for the Public Interest” was established in the 
Reconstruction Agency on February 10, 2012, replacing 
an existing volunteer management unit in the Cabinet 
office. In addition, the proportion of local governments’ 
mutual support extending beyond prefectural boundaries is 
increasing. For instance, there were 46.9% extra-prefectural 
agreements but in 2012, it has increased to 55.1%11. 
HFA Core Indicator 1.4:
A national multi-sectoral platform for disaster 
risk reduction is functioning.
Japan’s Multi-sectoral Platform 
for Disaster Risk Reduction
6
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HFA Priority for Action 2: Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning.
Improvement in Risk Assessment and 
Early Warning Systems with Real-time 
Monitoring: Lessons from the 2011 
Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami
7
HFA Core Indicator 2.1: 
National policy and local risk assessments based 
on hazard data and vulnerability information are 
available and include risk assessments for key 
sectors.
HFA Core Indicator 2.2:
Systems are in place to monitor, archive 
and disseminate data on key hazards and 
vulnerabilities.
HFA Core Indicator 2.3:
Early warning systems are in place for all major 
hazards, with outreach to communities.
Keywords:
hazard map, tsunami early warning, real-time monitoring, 
earthquake early warning, long-term earthquake forecast
Before:
Tsunami inundation maps produced from the risk evaluation 
based on historical events over 400 years have been 
distributed among the residents in coastal communities 
for utilization in developing their evacuation plans 
and preparedness procedures.  Nevertheless, previous 
inundations were much smaller than the 2011 Tohoku 
Earthquake and Tsunami, which caused more casualties 
without evacuation. Earthquakes followed by tsunamis 
recurred throughout history in each coastal area. Japan’s 
Cabinet Office Central Disaster Mitigation Council 
evaluated the earthquakes and tsunamis for the target 
regions’ safety levels, and the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) 
Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion (HERP) 
evaluated seismic activities, which are updated every 
year. Those results are available for creating hazard 
maps, conducting disaster response drills, and increasing 
awareness through the mitigation plan. However, the gap 
between the estimated and observed inundations was so 
large that it allowed people to take insufficient action.
Although the tsunami warning was issued roughly 3 
min after the earthquake, about 19,000 people (90% of 
casualties) were killed by the 2011 Tohoku Tsunami within 
20–30 min of its arrival at Sanriku and roughly 1 h of its 
arrival at Sendai bay; only two people were killed by the 
tsunami on the Pacific Ocean. The warning from the PTWC 
and Japanese media should have led to immediate Pacific 
coastal evacuation. Japan’s tsunami warning system began 
in 1952, providing information on the estimated tsunami 
arrival time and height, which is divided into two categories, 
depending on the arrival time lesser or greater than 1 h, that 
is, near or far field, respectively. The first tsunami warning 
in the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake was underestimated because 
of the lower earthquake magnitude estimation, and the 
second was updated using the tsunami data observed by 
a GPS buoy in real time offshore from Sanriku, Tohoku. 
Reasons for the large number of casualties due to the 
tsunami remain under investigation and discussion. Not 
only the warning’s accuracy but also its dissemination, 
traffic jams on the roads, and wrong directions to safe 
places have been reported by eyewitnesses.
HERP, a special governmental organization attached to the 
Prime Minister’s office (now part of MEXT) and established 
in 1995, has been releasing probable seismic hazard maps 
annually since 2005, compiling thousands of instrumental, 
historical, and paleoseismological data and numerical models 
of plausible future earthquake sources. The map released in 
2005 was the first publically available probabilistic seismic 
hazard map of major shaking for various purposes such as 
city planning and emergency local government response. In 
the map, the HERP expressed concern about frequent M7-8 
earthquakes along the Japan trench (the Sanriku coast to the 
Boso Peninsula) and announced a 98% chance of an M7.4-
8.0 earthquake offshore of Miyagi (Sendai) for the next 30 
years, based on 37-year average inter-event time of large 
subduction earthquakes during the past 200–300 years. Such 
high probability has effectively stimulated seismic retrofits, 
better city planning, and disaster drills. However, the extent of 
the M9.0 2011 Tohoku Earthquake’s large shaking areas was 
much wider than the map estimates, especially in Fukushima 
and Ibaraki, the southern region of the 2011 source.
Despite the size of the main Tohoku shock and areas of 
large seismic intensity, numerous buildings collapsed 
(~400,000), mostly from the tsunami; the number collapsing 
from shaking was rather limited. Less damage was observed 
in the newer buildings and houses. The ratio of the death 
toll associated with the collapses was less than several 
percent of the total, demonstrating that Japan’s building 
code, regulated since 1981 and reflecting the 1978 Miyagi-
oki earthquake, worked effectively. 
After the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, the Japanese government 
funded an enormous budget to deploy thousands of 
seismometers and GPS stations to monitor seismic and 
crustal activity. The National Research Institute for Earth 
Science and Disaster Prevention (NIED) has built three 
seismic networks (Hi-net, F-net, and K-net) for various 
purposes, and the Geospatial Information Authority of 
Japan (GSI) has operated 1,240 permanent GPS stations to 
monitor near-real-time ground movement. Furthermore, the 
ALOS satellite launched in 2006 by the Japan Aerospace 
Exploration Agency (JAXA) has been providing synthetic 
aperture radar data associated with several devastating 
earthquakes, including the Tohoku Earthquake, which 
expanded understanding of the earthquake rupture process. 
Data circulation and data sharing have improved annually 
and now allow even foreign scientists and engineers to 
help us provide better models and warnings. Such dense 
networks and real-time monitoring systems enable the Japan 
Meteorological Agency (JMA) to publically announce 
seismic intensity distribution within 1.5 min and the 
activity’s detailed hypocenter and magnitude information 
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within several minutes, supporting urgent rescue responses 
and operations. However, the Tohoku Earthquake’s size 
was so great that immediate estimate of magnitude was 
7.9 because of magnitude saturation in the high-frequency 
domains, causing underestimates of the tsunami height.
Since 2007, the JMA has been operating the earthquake 
early warning system, which provides immediate estimates 
of strong shaking within seconds to people before the 
actual seismic wave arrives. People can be informed of the 
warning via TV, radio, and mobile phone, as well as special 
devices, when the estimated JMA intensity reaches 5 or 
higher. Seventeen cases of the early warning through 2010 
have proven its validity and efficacy for disaster mitigation, 
for example, by suggesting that students hide themselves 
under their desks in school. In the Tohoku Earthquake, 
the system provided a warning eight seconds before the 
primary wave arrived at the city of Sendai, and successively 
stopped bullet trains in the Tohoku area. However, 
it underestimated ground acceleration in the Tokyo 
metropolitan area. Furthermore, the Tohoku Earthquake’s 
numerous aftershocks revealed the weakness of the early 
warning system in that it released a number of false alarms 
resulting from unexpected remote simultaneous aftershocks 
and interruptions of data transmission.
The JMA has been announcing advisories about the 
probabilities of subsequent large shaking (intensities 5 
or higher) due to aftershocks since the 2004 Niigata-ken-
Chuetsu Earthquake (M6.8). Statistics of well-recorded 
early aftershocks enable us to extrapolate the subsequent 
three- or seven-day probability of large aftershocks. It 
is useful to promote public awareness of the continuing 
danger. The advisory worked after the Tohoku Earthquake. 
However, the widespread aftershocks and remotely triggered 
earthquakes were unprecedented because of its extent of 
crustal deformation. Several M6 class inland earthquakes 
have occurred and caused local damage in Akita, Fukushima, 
Nagano, and Shizuoka Prefectures, located 100 km to 300 
km from the locus of high seismic slip. 
After:
To overcome the problem of inadequate evacuation due 
to the map’s underestimated inundation, the guideline for 
creating a tsunami hazard map is undergoing modification 
and revision. For example, the scenario should include the 
probable maximum as well as the previous maximum, and 
should be expanded to several scenarios to avoid a sense of 
certainty, especially of unjustified safety.
A new offshore network system in the Pacific Ocean, east 
of Japan, is going to be installed with more than 50 seismic 
and tsunami monitoring sensors, covering the trough in the 
deep sea where earthquakes and tsunamis have repeatedly 
originated. The system enables monitoring them in real time 
and providing more accurate estimations, even for a large-
scale event.
The HERP confirmed the validity of the methodology 
for creating the probabilistic seismic hazard map 
by retrospective tests beginning in 1890. The map 
underestimated the strong ground motion in Tohoku because 
of the ~200–300-year relatively short period of reliable 
historical and instrumental data.
We may have to consider hypothetical M9 super-cycles by 
taking pre-historic and paleoseismic data into account. The 
magnitude of the anticipated large earthquakes along the 
Nankai trough for southwest Japan has now increased to 
M9.0, based on the tsunami sediment and paleo-geodesy 
along the coastal regions.
To overcome the magnitude saturation issue that emerged 
from the Tohoku Earthquake, the Geospatial Information 
Authority of Japan (GSI) and Tohoku University have been 
developing a real-time magnitude determination system using 
continuous GPS data and a data assimilation technique.
Problems:
Limitation in the deterministic evaluation for a low-
frequency event such as the 2011 Tohoku disaster suggests 
a new approach, combining the statistical method with 
an inter-disciplinary approach including history, geology, 
sedimentrology, and physiography. A multi-scenario 
prediction would reduce the risk of governments and 
citizens having a false sense of certainty or safety.
Although the tsunami warning for a far field event is 
effective, the issues in a near field event remain because of 
having a short evacuation window. An early warning system 
should trigger the people to evacuate or take mitigating 
action. This system should be connected or cooperate with 
the planning of evacuations and systems/facilities in each 
area, which would require understanding people’s reasons 
for not taking action to move to safe areas despite receiving 
the warning in the 2011 Tohoku disaster. At the beginning 
of the earthquake and tsunami generation, errors or 
indefinite remains can be reduced by monitoring data in real 
time, indicating a speed–accuracy trade-off. It is important 
to receive the updated information timely after the event. 
Then the dissemination system, by combining mass media, 
ICT, and public information, can ensure people’s access to 
information at any time. 
The recent destructive earthquakes including the Tohoku 
Earthquake raised several critical issues in the probabilistic 
seismic hazard map. However, the map, averaging 
probabilities of strong ground motion from various sources in 
a given place, remains useful for seismic damage mitigation. 
The larger issue is to avoid people’s misunderstanding: the 
map does not indicate “earthquake probability.” 
In the Tohoku Earthquake, Japan’s recent building code 
demonstrated its protection against strong seismic motion. 
However, the domain of seismic acceleration and local 
intensity at a subduction earthquake is frequently different 
from that caused by large, shallow, inland earthquakes. 
Reconstructions and seismic retrofits of the old buildings 
are strongly recommended.
The earthquake early warning system has been steadily 
improving since its 2007 initiation. Frequent drills in the 
immediate action necessary within seconds before a seismic 
wave arrives have become far more important for protecting 
human life. Thus, we need to educate people on the 
warning system’s limitations, particularly for large inland 
earthquakes, and further promote seismic retrofits to prevent 
the collapse of old buildings.
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Fig. 2.1 a) Earthquake Probabilities of Subduction Earthquakes for the Next 30 Years (HERP, 2010). 
              b) A Comparison between the Expected Seismic Intensities Calculated from the Long-term Forecast and Observed Intensities Recorded 
                 for the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake.
Fig. 2.2 Observed Seismic Intensities of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake (left) and Intensities Estimated from the JMA Earthquake Early Warning 
             System (right). (Yamada, 2011)
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HFA Core Indicator 2.1: 
National policy and local risk assessments based 
on hazard data and vulnerability information are 
available and include risk assessments for key 
sectors.
Importance of Quantitative 
Assessment of Uncertainties and 




tsunami hazard assessment, quantitative uncertainty 
assessment, visualization of uncertainty
Context:
A tsunami hazard map is an indispensable map that shows the 
possible tsunami inundation area in order to consider tsunami 
disaster prevention measures. The Japanese government and 
most of the local governments along coastal areas in Japan 
have published many tsunami hazard maps.
Before:
Before the GEJE, the Miyagi-oki earthquake and the 
Sanriku-oki earthquake were assumed in the tsunami hazard 
maps published by the Miyagi prefectural government. 
The tsunami hazard maps published by most of the local 
governments along coastal area have also adopted an 
earthquake scenario.
After:
In many coastal areas of the Tohoku region, the area 
inundated by the GEJE tsunami exceeded the area specified 
in the tsunami hazard maps. As a result, some residents did 
not evacuate because they believed the inundation hazard 
maps. Against this background, there is a recent proposal 
to categorize a tsunami hazard as one of two types: L1 
tsunamis, which occur frequently and cause extensive 
damage even though they are not very high, and L2 
tsunamis, which occur at an extremely low frequency but 
cause massive amounts of damage.
Good practices:
It is certain that tsunami hazard maps have facilitated 
tsunami evacuation for the residents to some degree 
following the GEJE and other past earthquakes.
Problems:
Many uncertainties in tsunami wave height are present in 
each phase of the tsunami hazard assessment: earthquake 
generation, tsunami propagation and tsunami inundation. A 
problem is that the uncertainties are not explicitly described 
in the tsunami hazard maps. Tsunami hazard maps that 
do not concretely show the uncertainties could generate a 
situation beyond the assumption again such as the GEJE 
and mislead residents about potential tsunami hazards.
In the future, we need to quantify the uncertainties and 
clarify how much we can assure the tsunami hazard 
assessments. Hazard maps based on the two types of 
tsunamis (L1 and L2) are still insufficient for understanding 
the potential tsunami hazard. Some examples of visualizing 
uncertainties are as follows. Fig. 2.3 shows an uncertainty 
in the coastal tsunami wave height. Here, we defined the 
uncertainty as a coefficient of variation of the possible 
tsunami wave height. The uncertainty increases as the points 
pinken. We can also see regional characteristics of the 
uncertainty. Fig. 2.4 shows the uncertainty of the tsunami 
inundation around Soma port. The green area is the tsunami 
inundation area for a 500-years return period. The red and 
blue areas are inundation areas when the uncertainties are 
considered. Although the return period for each of the three 
cases is 500 years, the inundation areas factoring in the 
uncertainties differ. If the tsunami hazard map explicitly 
indicates the uncertainties of the tsunami hazard assessment 
as indicated above, residents who use the map can properly 
understand the uncertainties of the tsunami inundation area.
1  Fukutani, Yo., Suppasri, A., Abe, Y. and Imamura, F. (2014). Stochastic analysis and uncertainty assessment of tsunami wave height using a random slip source parameter model, 
   Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk Assessment. (submitted)
Fig. 2.3 Coefficient of variation of tsunami height 
             along Tohoku coastal area1
Fig. 2.4 Example of a stochastic tsunami hazard map
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HFA Core Indicator 2.1: 
National policy and local risk assessments based 
on hazard data and vulnerability information are 
available and include risk assessments for key 
sectors.
Tsunami Fragility Curves for 




tsunami fragility curve, risk assessment, statistical analysis, 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake Tsunami
Context:
Tsunami fragility curves (or tsunami fragility function) are 
defined as empirical relationships between vulnerability and 
tsunami hazard2. Tsunami fragility curves have been developed 
in performing tsunami risk analysis of structural or social 
systems to identify vulnerability against tsunami hazards 
using damage data associated with past events and observed 
or simulated tsunami hazard information such as flow depth, 
current velocity and hydrodynamic force on a structure.
Tsunami fragil i ty curves can be implemented for 
assessments of structural damage and fatalities within the 
exposed area against potential tsunami hazard scenarios. 
Multiplying the number of exposed structures and 
populations by the damage probability from the fragility 
curves equivalent to the estimated tsunami hazards provides 
the quantitative estimation of tsunami impact. 
Before:
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was the major event 
that earthquake fragility functions were widely applied 
to tsunami damage data in severely hit countries such as 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. While there was a 
limitation due to number of surveyed damaged buildings 
(some hundreds or thousands), advantage of remote sensing 
technology was utilized to interpret building damage. 
Fragility curves (Fig. 2.5) were then plotted using detailed 
tsunami features (flow depth and flow velocity) at each 
damaged building obtained from numerical simulation of 
tsunami inundation3.
After:
Japanese government put large effort on field survey of 
damaged buildings from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami. 
The database has more than 200,000 buildings with detailed 
information such as tsunami flow depth, building materials, 
number of stories, building functions and construction year4. 
This allowed us to apply more advance statistical methods 
that suit high quality of the disaggregate data. Fig. 2.6 
shows fragility functions for damage probability of building 
to be washed away.
Fig. 2.5 Tsunami fragility functions for Banda Aceh, Indonesia 
             in case of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami3
Fig. 2.6 Tsunami fragility functions in case of the 2011 Great 
              East Japan Tsunami based on field survey data 
             (a) Different building material, (b) Number of stories4
2  Koshimura, S., Y. Namegaya, and H. Yanagisawa, Tsunami Fragility – A New Measure to Identify Tsunami Damage –, Journal of Disaster Research Vol.4 No.6, pp.479-488, 2009.
3  Koshimura, S., Oie, T., Yanagisawa, H., & Imamura, F. (2009) Developing Fragility Functions for Tsunami Damage Estimation using numerical model and post-tsunami data 
  from Banda Aceh, Indonesia. Coastal Engineering Journal, Vol. 51, No. 3, 243–273.
4  Suppasri, A., Mas, E., Charvet, I., Gunasekera, R., Imai, K., Fukutani, Y., Abe, Y. and Imamura, F. (2013), Building damage characteristics based on surveyed data and fragility 
  curves of the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami, Natural Hazards, 66 (2), 319-341.
5  Koshimura, S., S. Hayashi and H. Gokon, Lessons from the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami Disaster, Journal of Disaster Research Vol.8 No.4, pp.549-560, 2013.
6  Suppasri, A., Muhari, A., Futami, T., Imamura, F. and Shuto, N. (2013) Loss functions of small marine vessels based on surveyed data and numerical simulation of the 2011 Great 
  East Japan Tsunami, Journal of Waterway, Port, Coastal and Ocean Engineering-ASCE (published online)
Good practices:
Many fragility functions have been developed according to 
various types of building and coastal conditions in different 
countries. These functions were used as supporting data 
for land use planning during reconstruction period and 
risk assessment for future tsunami at the same time. For 
instance, in developing the post-disaster reconstruction 
plan of Sendai city, the tsunami fragility curve was used 
as supporting information in determination of building 
restriction area (the area subject to relocation)5.  
The tsunami fragility curves were also applied to 
understanding risks and vulnerabilities of other properties 
such as marine vessels, and offshore evacuation or risk map 
can be created using this data6.
Problems:
The tsunami damage should be characterized by numerous 
uncertain factors. In this sense, tsunami fragility curves 
include some of uncertainties, and they may not be 
applicable in considering tsunami vulnerability when 
changing the areas of interest or considering other 
tsunami scenarios. Thus, we suggest that careful use and 
interpretations are required in using proposed tsunami 
fragility when applying. 
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HFA Core Indicator 2.2:
Systems are in place to monitor, archive 
and disseminate data on key hazards and 
vulnerabilities.
Small-area Population Estimates 
and Landscape Planning 




small-area, population census, iterative proportional fitting, 
geodesign, geographic information system
Context:
Spatial datasets and a Geographic Information System 
(GIS) are keys for accurately measuring natural hazards and 
vulnerability that varies according to area. For example, the 
socio-demographic characteristics of victims affected by 
natural disasters are not evenly distributed, and therefore 
effective measures for disaster prevention and reconstruction 
should differ according to the population characteristics of 
particular areas. Thus, detailed population datasets about the 
tenure of dwelling, family type, age of the head of household, 
etc. allow us to create “tailored” measures against disasters 
and toward reconstruction. In addition to spatial datasets, 
geodesign, a new planning tool using spatial datasets, has 
also gained attention. This framework combines different 
evaluation maps representing values of local residents and 
stakeholders in the GIS environment.
Before:
However, a lack of detailed population datasets for small 
areas is problematic. National statistical datasets such as 
the Population Census of Japan and the Housing and Land 
Survey of Japan are tabulated only up to the municipality 
level. Therefore, it is difficult to grasp detailed information 
of affected areas from published statistical data. On the 
other hand, there are only a few examples of geodesign 
applications for reconstruction planning. There is a gap 
between analytical needs and available data and methods.
After:
Using statistical tables derived from the Population Census 
of Japan, we developed a method to create an 8-dimensional 
table, which represents people’s living conditions by each 
basic unit of the census (the minimum statistical survey 
unit comprised approximately 50 households and has 
geographical coordinates of latitude and longitude).
Items of the 8-dimensional table about living conditions are 
as follows: household members by area (ward/municipality/
district/basic unit) × sex × age group × family type × tenure of 
dwelling × building type and stories of house × area of floor 
space × head/non-head of household. “Iterative Proportional 
Fitting” was applied to make estimated population counts 
converge to marginal totals of the census tables.
A geodesign workshop was held as an intensive course 
at Tohoku University to design a new land use layout of 
Soma City, Fukushima Prefecture. The evaluation maps and 
change models (new land use layout) were created by the 
participants (Fig. 2.7) after extensive discussion.
Good practices:
The feature of this work is to conduct data estimation at the 
smallest statistical unit that is geographically recorded as a 
point. We can count the total population by any eight items 
at each point of the basic unit, and it is possible to analyze 
people’s conditions within areas stricken by a tsunami or 
earthquake.
We confirmed the effectiveness of geodesign for regional 
reconstruction planning because it can effectively consider 
local variations of risks and vulnerabilities to natural 
hazards as well as the value and needs of residents and 
stakeholders. Using both spatially detailed population 
datasets and a geodesign framework will contribute to 
making more effective reconstruction plans.
Fig. 2.7 Change models (land use layout) created at the geodesign workshop
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HFA Core Indicator 2.3:
Early warning systems are in place for all major 
hazards, with outreach to communities.
Earthquake Early Warning 
System in Schools and at a 




earthquake early warning system, application in schools, 
2011 Tohoku Earthquake, evacuation drill
Context:
Earthquake early warning systems (EEWS) can provide 
precious seconds for taking action before strong ground 
shaking occurs. EEWS save lives by stopping trains before 
they pass over damaged tracks, facilitating the evacuation 
of elevators, etc. Systems that detect earthquakes near their 
source and issue warnings before strong ground shaking 
occurs have been used in Japan, Mexico, and Taiwan, 
and similar systems are being studied for earthquakes in 
Southern California, US, and other seismically active areas. 
The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) has provided 
warning information for public users via television and 
radio since October 1, 2007.
EEWS in schools have been developed and applied to 
schools in Miyagi Prefecture 7 in order to enhance the social 
basis of understanding EEWS and to ensure the safety of 
students and staffs by providing warning information.
First successful example of EEW in schools7:
Fig. 2.8 illustrates an EEW evacuation drill in a school that 
actually adopted the EEW guidelines of JMA. In Miyagi 
Prefecture, EEW applications have been performed at eight 
schools as government projects. During the Iwate-Miyagi 
Inland Earthquake (M7.2) on June 14, 2008, the school EEWS 
worked successfully. At a junior high school in Shiroishi City, 
with an epicentral distance of 110 km, 102 students were 
evacuated thanks to an EEW 21 s before the S waves arrived.
EEW application at a University
Fig. 2.9 shows the EEW application system at Tohoku 
University where the university LAN has been used to 
transmit EEW since 2009. The EEW information is transferred 
to the broadcasting system of each bureau when the expected 
seismic intensity exceeds a preset threshold intensity.
Good practices during the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake:
During the Tohoku Earthquake, at all most all of the schools 
with EEW installed, pupils were able to evacuate because 
the warning alarm sounded before severe shaking; 1415 
s before shaking in Sendai, 17 s in Furukawa, Osaki City, 
and 21 s in Shiroishi City 8. At one elementary school in 
Sendai, students avoided being crushed by toppled shoebox 
thanks to EEW, and staff were able to avoid being injured 
by large-sized safes in the staff room, even if the safes box 
were fixed 8. A teacher in charge of EEW reported that, after 
the experience of the Tohoku Earthquake (main shock), 
students were able to evacuate by themselves when the 
EEW sounded for the many aftershocks.
Based on this success, MEXT (Ministry of Education, 
Science and Culture) funded the installation of EEWS at 
1,000 schools in 2012 and 500 in 2013.
At the Aobayama campus of Tohoku University, EEW was 
issued at buildings with EEWS 13 s before severe shaking 
helped students and staff evacuate to safe areas even though 
the building sustained severe damage.
7  Masato Motosaka and Makoto Homma, Earthquake Early Warning System Application for School Disaster Prevention, Journal of Disaster Research Vol.4 No.4, 229-236, 2009
8  Masato Motosaka, Tohoku Earthquake Disaster and Earthquake Early Warning, UC-Berkeley Seismo Laboratory Seminar, April 3, 2012
Problems learnt from the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake:
●  Determining source parameters is difficult for a huge 
     earthquake and leads to underestimation of the magnitude. 
     Consequently, the EEW may fail to connect to the 
     broadcasting system depending on the threshold value.
●  Evacuation drills using the drill function of EEWS  and 
    daily maintenance of EEWS are needed for evacuation 
    during a real earthquake. The degree of  maintenance 
    divided black and white for the EEW utilization.
●  Problems with false alarms are serious, especially when 
    two aftershocks occur simultaneously behind a main 
    shock. Countermeasures to prevent this are needed.
●  Successive change of source information is needed for a huge 
     earthquake, and EEWS would be available for this change.
●  On-site earthquake observation data can be used to 
    enhance the accuracy of ground motion prediction but are 














2nd distribution dealer 
Earthquake 
Fig. 2.8 Response to EEW in school
Fig. 2.9 EEWS at Tohoku University
EEW
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HFA Core Indicator 2.3:
Early warning systems are in place for all major 
hazards, with outreach to communities.
Monitoring of Land Slides 
and Status of Buildings and 




GB-SAR, landslide, monitoring, radar, Arato-zawa, Miyagi-
Iwate Nairiku earthquake
Context:
Radar technology is now available to monitor large-scale 
landslides. A demonstration in Arato-zawa shows promising 
results, and pertinent information should be delivered to the 
local inhabitants.
Before:
Landslides can be caused by earthquakes, volcanic 
activity, strong rain and storms. While landslides can 
occur sometimes very abruptly, in many cases they move 
very slowly. Available technologies are now being used 
to monitor areas prone to landslides. For example, strain 
meters and tiltmeters can be placed on the slope, and can 
continuously monitor the deformation of the land surface. 
Recently, high-precision GPS has also been used to monitor 
the movement of the ground surface. These techniques are 
effective when the location of the movement is obvious 
and these discrete sensors can be placed in the appropriate 
positions. However, if the position of the movement is 
unclear or distributed across a large area, deploying these 
discrete sensors is costly and largely ineffective.
After:
We propose the use of ground-based synthetic aperture radar 
(GB-SAR) to monitor the ground surface displacement. One 
GB-SAR unit can observe a wide area of the landslide, and 
can detect sub-millimeter displacements. Moreover, GB-
SAR can monitor the ground surface condition continuously, 
and could be used to provide an automatic early warning 
if the GB-SAR detects any anomalous movement of the 
ground surface.
Good practices:
We have continuously monitored the ground surface 
condition by GB-SAR at the Arato-zawa site in Kurihara 
City, Japan shown in Fig.2.10 since 2011. Very large-scale 
landslides occurred at Arato-zawa as a result of the Iwate-
Miyagi Nairiku earthquake in 2008. Fig. 2.11 shows the 
GB-SAR system installed at the Arato-zawa site.
The GB-SAR system acquires radar data every 5 min, and 
the data are transferred to Remote PC over the Internet for 
analysis. Fig. 2.12 shows one of the SAR interferometry 
images. The color indicates the deformation of the ground 
surface, where the green area is stable and red and blue 
areas indicate small displacements. This specific SAR 
interferometry image was created using data before and 
after a small-scale earthquake, and we think that soil and 
rocks have fallen down as a result of the earthquake. This is 
indicated by the red area, which can be seen in the middle 
of the cliff.
Problems:
Because the system transmits electromagnetic waves, 
permission to use it must be obtained from the government. 
If the process of obtaining permission is simplified, GB-
SAR systems can be installed more easily. More experience 
using the system is required to increase its accuracy. The 
method in which the early warning information is provided 
to the local inhabitants must also be carefully studied.
Fig. 2.10 Arato-zawa landslide area. The GB-SAR system can be seen at 
               the bottom left
Fig. 2.11 GB-SAR system installed at the Arato-zawa site
Fig. 2.12 SAR Interferometry image that shows the location of ground 
               surface deformation
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HFA Core Indicator 3.1:
Relevant information on disasters is available 
and accessible at all levels, to all stakeholders 
(through networks, development of information 
sharing systems, etc.)
Information Sharing, Cooperation, 
and Expert Training Provided by 
Academic Research Institutes for 
Natural Disasters
13
HFA Priority for Action 3: Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels.
Keywords:
academic research institute for natural disasters, 
background, mission
Context:
Various countermeasures have been implemented on the 
basis of the experiences of many great natural disasters, 
including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, tsunamis, 
typhoons, landslides, etc. This section focuses on the role 
of academics suggested by any previous great disaster. HFA 
Core Indicators in this section are altered from the original 
indicators, maintaining the original priority.
Before:
First, we summarize the century-long history of the 
establishment of academic disaster research institutes. The 
Tokyo University Earthquake Research Institute (ERI) 
was established in 1925, two years after the great Kanto 
earthquake. The principles and goals of scientific research are 
to promote research of the solid earth, and to pioneer a way 
to better understand earthquakes and volcanic activities. 
The Kyoto University Disaster Prevention Research 
Institute (DPRI) was founded in 1951 in response to severe 
damage caused by a huge typhoon that struck Japan that 
year. Since its establishment, the DPRI has responded to 
a variety of natural disasters and has promoted research in 
the disaster sciences, with the goal of mitigating damage. 
Many researchers and graduate students work in the DPRI, 
with specialties ranging from natural science, engineering, 
informatics, to social sciences. It also maintains 15 
experimental and observatory facilities outside the campus 
for unique field investigations, on-site observations, and 
large experiments. 
The National Research Institute for Earth Science and 
Disaster Prevention (NIED) was established in 1963, 
motivated by the disastrous 1959 Typhoon Isewan. 
Originally, an independent administrative institution is 
defined as one that efficiently and effectively promotes 
programs that should be securely administered from the 
public perspective, but always need not be executed by the 
government itself and cannot be expected to be supported 
by private enterprises. Research on disaster prevention is 
one such work.  
The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Memorial Disaster 
Reduction and Human Renovation Institute (DRI) offers 
Table 3.1 List of Great Natural Disasters and Academic Research Institutes 
                for Natural Disasters
programs in which visitors can learn the effects of that 
earthquake and lessons learned from the experience that 
should be shared with younger generations. The DRI began 
in 1959 as an archive project and after 2002 has also worked 
to convey expertise and knowledge to the public in an easy-
to-understand manner so as to help our cities, communities, 
and the populace becomes better prepared against disasters. 
Such efforts are based on the concept that disaster risk 
management and mitigation requires the involvement of 
not only the national and local governments but also local 
communities and individuals.
After:
For a hundred years, fundamental science and technology 
related to disasters has been developed in Japan based 
on fundamental scientific knowledge, and many experts 
have emerged. However, our knowledge has proven to be 
insufficient to save lives, to provide correct information, and 
to make well-informed decisions, because the damage by 
the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake was extraordinarily 
massive and the damaged area so vast, as never before 
31
HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
experienced. Experts in each division are less experienced 
in connection to that in other divisions. The highest priority 
is thus an integrated system of knowledge.
Such a system demands consideration of social engineering, 
social  sciences,  and humanit ies in implementing 
countermeasures. It also requires reinforcing efforts for 
effective risk communication about a very low frequency 
great disaster, including its uncertainty, limitation of 
predicting natural phenomena, and the promotion of 
integrated research among different fields such as 
seismology, geology, archeology, history, and practical 
expert training.
Having experienced the catastrophic disaster in 2011, 
Tohoku University founded the International Research 
Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS). Along with 
collaborating organizations from many countries and with 
broad areas of specialization, the IRIDeS conducts world-
leading research on natural disaster science and disaster 
mitigation. Based on the lessons from the 2011 Great East 
Japan (Tohoku) Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster, the 
IRIDeS strives to become a global center for the study 
of disasters and disaster mitigation, learning from and 
building on past lessons in disaster management from 
Japan and around the world. Throughout, the IRIDeS will 
contribute to ongoing recovery/reconstruction efforts in 
affected areas by conducting action-oriented research and 
pursuing effective disaster management to build sustainable 
and resilient societies. The IRIDeS innovates the previous 
paradigm of Japan’s and the rest of the world’s management 
for catastrophic natural disasters to become a foundation 
of disaster mitigation management and sciences. Disaster 
mitigation management seeks to avoid or reduce potential 
losses from natural hazards, to ensure prompt assistance 
to victims, to achieve rapid and effective recovery, and to 
build disaster-resilient and sustainable societies through the 
five stages of the disaster management cycle: mitigation, 
preparedness, response, recovery, and reconstruction. The 
action-oriented research of the IRIDeS addresses each stage 
in the cycle and integrates and universalizes the scientific 
discoveries for implementation worldwide.
The Inter-Graduate School Doctoral Degree Program 
on Science for Global Safety, the Ministry of Education 
(MEXT) program for Leading Graduate Schools, 
commenced in 2012, and the IRIDeS contributes to this 
program. Participating students have an integrated practical 
program, an all-round resource, called the “Kopeito” 
(cultivate) model.
Good practices:
Having experienced many catastrophic disasters through 
history, we have established academic/research institutes 
and education systems from various aspects.
Problems:
Promotion of integrated research of different fields such as 
seismology, geology, and archeology was insufficient. The 
failure to anticipate massive earthquakes and tsunamis by 
taking every possibility into account was noted.
HFA Core Indicator 3.2:
School curricula, education material and 
relevant training include disaster risk reduction 
and recovery concepts and practices.
Education to Build a Culture 
of Safety and Resilience at 




outreach, social decisions, personal action, daily training, 
local media, IT-network, SNS
Before:
For longer than the past decade, there were two main 
backgrounds for countermeasures for disaster prevention in 
Japan: science communication and administrative policy.
 The White Paper on Science and Technology, 2004 noted 
the importance of scientists and engineers, as members of 
society, engaging in exchanges with the people, so as to 
strengthen mutual trust and to encourage the people to treat 
science and technology as issues of personal importance. 
In 2005, on the basis of those backgrounds, programs for 
science communication had begun at Hokkaido University, 
Waseda University, and Tokyo University by the Science 
and Technology Promotion Fund. Science communication 
programs had then spread across other universities, and 
many outreach programs were held at universities, large 
academic research projects, and academic societies. 
Research institutes contributed to public programs based 
on the political concept.  During these 10 years, the NIED 
has performed public services through basic research and 
development on disaster reduction as well as dissemination 
of research results for the benefit of society. Regarding 
the seismic hazard, two major projects proceeded utilizing 
the nationwide seismic network and the 3D Full-scale 
Earthquake Testing Facility (E-defense), both of which were 
constructed after the disastrous Kobe earthquake in 1995.
The DPRI serves as a national research center on natural 
disasters and their prevention and mitigation, authorized 
by the MEXT. Researchers working on natural disasters 
from various Japanese universities gather at DPRI, use its 
experimental and observatory facilities, and jointly work with 
DPRI researchers. Another role of the DPRI is to promptly 
provide diverse support at disaster sites in and outside Japan 
by offering advice regarding what to do, what aid is needed, 
how to secure and organize volunteers, and other relevant 
issues while working on pragmatic tasks with local personnel. 
In preparation for such tasks, our team is developing skills 
and expertise for managing potential challenges at disaster 
sites. Furthermore, several institutions and UN organizations 
related to disaster management are located in this area. This 
proximity enables the DPRI to serve as one of world’s key 
centers for information on disaster risk management, in 
collaboration with these organizations. 
The good qualities of human beings such as flexibility, 
kindness, generosity, strength, and joviality are the basis for 
building an attractive life, home, community, and society. 
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To promote a prosperous society of the 21st century based 
on harmonious coexistence with nature, the DPRI will strive 
to disseminate useful disaster management information and 
expertise, which we believe are closely linked with the mindset 
of appreciating the importance and preciousness of life.
After:
The ERI speedily provided scientific information on the 
earthquake. The ERI succeeded in making the mechanism 
of the earthquake and tsunami easy to understand on the 
basis of precise analysis.
In addition to its domestic activities, the DPRI has 
established formal Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) 
with 40 foreign research institutions (as of August, 2012) 
and organizes numerous joint projects and seminars to 
serve as an international center for research and education 
on natural disasters and their mitigation. The past decade 
has witnessed a notable increase in the intensity of natural 
disasters, such as the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and 
Tsunami. To respond to the serious needs for the protection 
of the lives and assets of our people and society, the DPRI 
promises to continue to enhance its research efforts, using 
the knowledge and experience accumulated over the last 
several decades.
On the basis of NIDE’s practical outputs in the past 10 years, 
they entered “The Third Five-year Plan” period in April, 2011 
through negotiation with the Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science, and Technology as well as the Ministries 
of Finance and of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
Synchronized with this turning point, we have changed the 
organization of our institute to create a more efficient system. 
The research sector was reorganized into three departments: 
Monitoring and Forecast, Experimental Research, and 
Social Systems; the management sector was simplified by 
spinning off the planning section. Further, the Outreach 
and International Research Promotion Center was newly 
established to strengthen public services and international 
activities, archive projects including a rental camera system 
for victims, etc.
In April, 2011, “The 4th Science and Technology Basic Plan” 
was also launched by the Council for Science and Technology 
Policy, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. In this plan, 
the role of science and technology is highlighted to challenge 
important policy goals, one of which is “Realization of Rich 
and High-quality Life.” Lessons from the Great East Japan 
Earthquake are summarized in the White Paper on Science 
and Technology, 2012. The public’s trust in scientists declined 
because of the gap between expectation and reality. We thus 
urgently need promotion of integrated research of different 
fields such as seismology, geology, archeology, and history 
to sufficiently understand earthquakes and tsunamis. There 
was overconfidence in embankments and technology; some 
people did not evacuate because they lacked knowledge of 
the limitations of existing countermeasures and technologies. 
Scientific and technological risks and uncertainty involved 
have not been seriously considered with regard to the 
government’s and experts’ provision of information to the 
public. Therefore, most of the people lacked an adequate 
understanding of the situation.
Social engineering, social sciences, and humanities must be 
considered in implementing countermeasures. Anticipating 
massive earthquakes and tsunamis must take every 
possibility into account.
 The IRIDeS has created a new academia of disaster 
mitigation that subsumes the lessons from the 2011 Tohoku 
Earthquake and Tsunami and the findings of world-leading 
research into our societies with the purpose of establishing 
social systems that respond promptly, sensibly, and 
effectively to natural disasters, withstanding adversities 
with resiliency, and passing and exploiting the lessons to 
the subsequent disaster management cycles. Enhancing 
cooperation with the local municipalities and governments 
in the affected areas and contributing to their recovery and 
reconstruction efforts, the IRIDeS conducts action-oriented 
research. They strive to create disaster-resilient societies 
that can overcome the complex and diverse processes of 
natural disasters, not only by mitigation strategies but also 
by preparing for and responding to them, and achieving 
recovery and renovation, thus engendering the culture of 
disaster-resiliency incorporated into our social systems.
The action-oriented research of the IRIDeS focuses on the 
following points:
1)  Investigating the physics of global scale natural disasters 
     such as mega-earthquakes, tsunamis, and extreme weather,
2) Reconstructing disaster response and mitigation 
technologies based on the lessons of the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake and tsunami disaster,
3)  Inventing “Affected Area Supportology” in the aftermath 
     of natural disasters,
4) Enhancing disaster-resiliency and performance of 
     multiple-fail-safe systems in regional and urban areas,
5) Establishing disaster medicine and medical service 
     systems towards catastrophic natural disasters,
6)  Designing disaster-resilient societies and developing the 
digital archive system to pass the lessons from the 
disasters.
The Inter-Graduate School Doctoral Degree Program on 
Science for Global Safety develops human resources through 
integrated education in the five-year doctoral program across 
university departments for students in humanities, sciences, 
and technologies. It develops leaders in the area of global 
safety who have a substantial knowledge of liberal arts, 
international adaptability, a high sense of ethics, and a clear 
vision, and are able to think and act appropriately on such 
bases. They are expected to contribute to the protection of 
human lives, societies, and industries from global disasters 
such as the Great East Japan Earthquake.
In this program, interdisciplinary cutting-edge education 
and research are conducted on the basis of practical disaster 
prevention studies in the (IRIDeS), with participation by the 
Graduate Schools of Science, Engineering, Environmental 
Studies, Arts and Letters, and others, so that this integrated 
program can combine knowledge from the natural sciences, 
social sciences, and liberal arts. This program strives to 
develop excellent human resources with core specialties, 
the ability to apply them in various areas, and other required 
abilities for leaders, through activities at recovery sites from 
the Great East Japan Earthquake and conducting world-
class research.
Finally, we focus on the action of non-experts. For roughly 
the past decade, many technologies have enabled people 
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to transmit information rapidly and simultaneously. 
Government offices transmit disaster information and action 
indicator messages through mass media and people expect 
unified information from responsible organizations. During 
the past several years, Internet technology has developed. 
The specific information path has diverged with interactive 
communication. Personal interactive information excluding 
mass media now enables direct personal interaction.
Good practices:
1)  Scientific experts have increased in Japan. The speedy 
supply of scientific information about the mechanism 
of earthquakes and tsunamis has occurred. That 
information is open for access and quickly archived. 
2)  Disaster prevention education by Dr. Katada of the 
University of Gunma, which underpinned the “Kamaishi 
Miracle,” became famous after the Great East Japan 
Disaster. Dr. Katada said that it was skills for life, not a 
miracle. Kamaishi is in the Sanriku Coastal Area, where 
disaster prevention education and countermeasures were 
relatively active. He emphasized the reality of tsunamis 
and the existence of preconditions in the hazard map 
to overcome the gap between well-informed action 
and carelessness regarding hazards. That orderly and 
repeated education caused success.  
Problems:
The public’s trust in scientists has declined because of 
the gap between expectations and reality. We urgently 
need integrated research in different fields to sufficiently 
understand earthquakes and tsunamis. Communities lack a 
sufficient number of interpreters and coordinators between 
experts and non-experts.
Fig. 3.1 Evacuation Drill for Tsunamis at an Elementary School
HFA Core Indicator 3.2:
School curricula, education material and 
relevant training include disaster risk reduction 
and recovery concepts and practices.
Education Practice Program for 
Improving Response Capability 
to Survive a Tsunami
15
Keywords:
1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, 2011 Great East 
Japan Tsunami, disaster reduction education, education tools
Context:
Issues for disaster reduction education in school have 
become more important since the substantial loss of 
children due to the 2011 disaster. Education in school is one 
method that helps to maintain or increase disaster awareness 
of children to survive such catastrophic disasters.
Before:
Before the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami disaster, the 
1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake was the most recent 
large-scale disaster in Japan. More than six thousand lives 
were lost, including almost 600 people younger than 20 
years old (Fig. 3.2). However, because it was an inland 
earthquake that occurred in the early morning, most of the 
children that died were at home. The fact shows importance 
of disaster reduction education to improve children’s risk 
awareness.
After:
The situation surrounding the 2011 Great East Japan 
Tsunami differed from that of the earthquake in 1995. The 
tsunami hit the east coast of Japan 30–60 min after the 
massive earthquake struck in the afternoon. Even though the 
disaster occurred during the daytime when most children 
were supposed to be safe in school, and they had at least 
30 min to evacuate, the tsunami killed nearly 700 people 
younger than 19 years old in the Tohoku area (Fig. 3.2). 
Even though the number of deaths from the 2011 disaster 
1  Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2011) Disaster prevention white paper, http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h23/index.htm. 
2  Yasuda, M., Imamura, F. and Suppasri, A. (2014) Practical education program for improving response capability to survive from tsunami, in: Proceeding of the Tohoku research 
   group for natural disaster science, Akita University, 7-8 January 2013 (in Japanese).
Fig. 3.2 Number of deaths by age for the 1995 Earthquake and 
             2011 Tsunami disasters1
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for those older than 30 is quite large, the number of children 
is almost the same as the number for the 1995 disaster. 
Some successful stories emerged from this disaster, such as 
the “Miracle of Kamaishi”, in which all the elementary and 
junior high school children survived. While their schools 
were designated evacuation shelters, they realized that the 
tsunami might be bigger than that predicted by the hazard 
map. They finally decided to evacuate to higher ground, and 
all of them survived because of disaster education and drills.
Good practices:
The “Miracle of Kamaishi” is an example of a good 
practice, as disaster reduction education was continuously 
and well taught in the schools. The children had high 
awareness, and they were able to think of the catastrophe 
beyond what might be expected and find a survival route. 
Many ideas for new education courses for disaster reduction 
in school have been proposed since the 2011 disaster. An 
activity in Sendai2 shows that children have higher disaster 
awareness, know how to survive or protect themselves and 
tell what they have learned in the class to their parents.
Problems:
Although there are a number of new education courses, they 
are mainly paper-based materials, and children might soon 
forget about them or infrequently review them. A new tool 
that applies disaster reduction information to everyday use 
is called “Gensai Pocket YUI”3 and is an example of future 
education tools. Information such as disaster phenomena, 
things to have prepared and evacuation measures are printed 
on the handkerchief. Children can use this handkerchief to 
wrap their lunch boxes and test themselves with the quizzes 
every day. More effort needs to be spent on creating new 
tools for disaster reduction that are interesting for children 
and help maintain disaster awareness during every day life.
Fig. 3.3 Gensai Pocket YUI3
3  Sendai Television Incorporated (2014) Gensai Pocket YUI: http://www.ox-tv.co.jp/topics/yui_pocket/ 
4  Aiko SAKURAI, Takeshi SATO, Yoshiyuki MURAYAMA, Eriko TOKUYAMA, “Development of a School-Based Disaster Education Program: A Case of a “Reconstruction 
   Map Making” Program in Ishinomaki-City”. Proceedings at the 9th APRU Research Symposium on Multi-Hazards on the Pacific Rim at National Taiwan University, 2013. 
HFA Core Indicator 3.2:
School curricula, education material and 
relevant training include disaster risk reduction 
and recovery concepts and practices.
Development of the Reconstruction 




Post-disaster education program, tsunami-affected school, 
periods of integrated studies, teaching plan, town-watching
Context:
Disaster education should define in a life cycle of a disaster 
from preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. The 
goal of disaster education at school is to build the abilities 
not only to survive a disaster but also to be supporters in the 
reconstruction process.
Before:
Experiences of and recovery from the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake shape the foundation of disaster education in 
Japan. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology (MEXT) has been promoting disaster risk 
reduction in education by setting school safety guidelines 
and developing and distributing training and reference 
materials for teachers. Disaster education at school has 
been integrated into existing curricula such as science, 
social studies, and life environment studies. Though many 
materials and programs were developed, most of them 
were stand alone. Standardization of methodologies for 
replication and upscaling has been sought. 
 After:
The Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, 
reaffirmed the importance of disaster education, especially 
in developing the ability to assess a situation and take 
proactive measures to protect one’s life. In 2012, MEXT 
announced a five-year plan called the Promotion of School 
Safety based on the 2009 School Health and Safety 
Act. The plan emphasizes promotion of systematic and 
comprehensive school safety measures based on scientific 
and practical knowledge and cooperation among schools, 
households, and local communities.
The Reconstruction Mapping Program4 is a disaster 
education program at Kazuma Elementary School in 
Ishinomaki. The school is located 1 km from the coastline. 
Although the school re-opened in the same building on April 
21, most of the school district was flooded by the March 
2011 tsunami. When the Program was started in 2012, there 
still remained many vacant lots at the southern end of the 
school district due to the water outflow that washed away 
houses, requiring many displaced children to commute from 
outside of the school district.
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The Program is aimed at helping children cope with their 
experiences during the disaster. The entire school district 
is divided into 12 groups, and each group walks through 
the tsunami-damaged school district. The children keep 
records of the reconstruction process, interview people 
in the community, and present this information in a 
“Reconstruction Map.”
Source: Kazuma Elementary School
Fig. 3.4 Sample of a 2013 Reconstruction Map
Fig. 3.5 Organization of the Program (Sample duration: 12 hours)
Good Practices:
The Reconstruction Mapping Program was started through 
partnerships among Ishinomaki City’s Board of Education; 
the school’s principal, teachers, and school children; an 
NGO; and university researchers. It has been implemented 
in the school curriculum during the fourth-grade Period for 
Integrated Studies. A teaching plan was also developed, 
which is structured according to the children’s development 
phases and the objectives of the subject and the education 
unit. The teaching plan may implement the Program in a 
sustainable manner with the possibility of expansion to 
other areas. 
The Program has given children firsthand experience in 
the reconstruction of their community, which has helped 
them better know their community and has increased their 
motivation to actively participate in the community’s 
reconstruction process.
Problems:
Issues identified through the two-year implementation of 
the Program include 
●  keeping a close eye on the children’s mental condition, 
●  providing the opportunity for children to feel they are 
    contributing to the community’s reconstruction through 
    the dissemination of artifacts and records, 
●  accumulating records and artifacts collected by the 
    children as an asset for the school to further develop 
    educational materials, 
●  getting more community participation in the Program 
    implementation, and 
●  examining the effectiveness of the program for 
    dissemination to other areas in Japan and the world.
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HFA Core Indicator 3.2:
School curricula, education material and 
relevant training include disaster risk reduction 
and recovery concepts and practices.
International Post-graduate 
Education Program for Disaster 
Medicine; Collaboration with 




human security, education for disaster medicine, 
international post-graduate program
Context:
Human security is a concept of security and focuses 
on an individual’s safety rather than state security. Its 
goal is “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. 
The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 
(hereinafter GEJET) posed a “crisis of human security”. 
Tohoku University promoted collaboration between the 
International Post-Graduate Program in Human Security 
and the International Research Institute of Disaster Science.
Before:
Human security is a concept of security. It focuses on 
individuals, not states, which used to be the main concern 
of the traditional notion of security.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had 
already pointed out that a disaster would be a significant 
threat to human security in its report published in 1994, and 
the importance of climate change in the study of human 
security has increased. However, disaster medicine is not a 
mainstream part of human security.
Tohoku University established the International Post-
Graduate Program in Human Security in 2005. Four 
graduate schools, the Graduate School of Agricultural 
Science, the Graduate School of Medicine, the Graduate 
School of International Cultural Studies and the Graduate 
School of Environmental Studies participate in this 
interdisciplinary program. Before the GEJET, less attention 
has been paid to disaster medicine in human security.
After:
The earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, killed 
many people and destroyed cities and villages. Evacuation 
centers were resource-limited and thought to be at high 
risk for outbreaks of infectious diseases. Furthermore, the 
accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
created much anxiety concerning radiation leaks, for which 
the health effects remain unclear. The impact of the disaster 
was far beyond anyone’s anticipation, and the security of 
people in affected areas was greatly impaired.
To address these issues, Tohoku University Human Security 
Program started a collaboration between disaster medicine 
and human security. The Division of Disaster Medicine, 
International Research Institute of Disaster Science 
(IRIDeS) and Human Security Program opened a joint 
lecture on “Disaster Preparedness for Public Health” as one 
of the subjects for the Human Security Program.
The Graduate School of Medicine, Tohoku University 
has developed department-level exchange agreements 
to operate a linkage program, a double degree course, 
with the University of Brawijaya and Graduate School 
of Agricultural Sciences, and Padjadjaran University. 
These two department-level exchange agreements will be 
developed at the university level. In addition, IRIDeS is 
now preparing another two department-level agreements 
with the School of Medicine, University of the Philippines 
and Public Health School of Angeles University Foundation.
Good practices:
The Human Security Program at Tohoku University 
provides resources for international students to learn lessons 
from the GEJET. Tohoku University has developed an 
exchange agreement at multiple levels with universities in 
various Asian Pacific countries.
Problems:
Although the Human Security Program at Tohoku 
University is open to both international and domestic 
students, a majority of applicants are from outside Japan. 
The students have few opportunities to experience directly 
the lessons learned from GEJET unless they are able to 
travel outside the university.
37
HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
well as lifetime prediction of infrastructures in urban areas.
After:
The Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster featured 
complexity and wide-ranging damage. In view of numerical 
simulations for advanced risk mitigation, the tsunami-
structure and/or tsunami-soil interactions must be noted 
aspects of complex disasters in widespread areas. Also, the 
risks due to the diffusion of contaminants and the generation 
and expansion of fire are manifested as a result of the 
complexity. Unfortunately, however, highly developed but 
individual methodologies and techniques for corresponding 
single-phase phenomena are less useful in predicting 
such coupled physical and/or chemo-thermomechanical 
phenomena. Thus, to make numerical simulations more 
reliable, specific algorithms for large-scale computations of 
complex disasters need to be developed.
Good practices:
Researchers have started to combine individual methods 
and have tried to solve the real coupled problems involved 
in complex disasters with sufficient quantitative accuracy. 
In particular, young engineers and scientists, being aware 
of the implication of developments, have established 
study groups to exchange ideas with different disciplines. 
Sophistication of the visual representation of analysis 
results is also recognized as important for decision-making 
by government officials.
Problems:
Actual complex disasters involving interactions between 
structures, fluids, and soils/rocks are too complicated 
for all the phenomena to be reproduced with sufficient 
quantitative accuracy. Not only technical difficulties, but 
also uncertainties make such predictions intractable. In fact, 
although numerous attempts have been made, most of them 
do not have a high enough level of performance for practical 
use in terms of reliability and versatility. Also, methods 
of parallel computation for huge-scale complex problems 
in widespread areas are still under development. To orient 
the research area of computational disaster science, we 
must create a new framework of numerical simulations for 
solving coupled problems in complex disasters.
HFA Core Indicator 3.3:
Research methods and tools for multi-risk 
assessments and cost-benefit analysis are 
developed and strengthened. 
Recent Advances in Numerical 
Simulation for Disaster 
Prevention in the View of the 2011 
Great East Japan Earthquake
18
Keywords:
numerical simulations, mathematical modeling, 
visualization, disaster prevention, mitigation
Context:
The Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster has increased 
awareness of the importance of numerical simulations to 
much more than before and, at the same time, highlighted 
the immaturity of this field in various aspects. This article 
reviews previous and current methodologies and techniques 
for numerical simulations and describes the challenges 
faced based on the lessons learned from the 3.11 Disaster.
Before:
Individual modeling methodologies and simulation 
techniques seemed to be mature, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, since a variety of general-purpose simulation 
software packages were sufficiently reliable for specific 
single-phase phenomena. In particular, structural analysis 
methods are effectively utilized for earthquake-resistant 
design in practical computations, and tsunami simulation 
programs provide good accuracies for predicting run-up 
regions. The main lesson learned from the Great Hanshin 
Earthquake Disaster was the necessity of developing robust 
numerical simulation schemes that enable us to predict the 
failure of structures with specific load bearing capacities 
and reproduce post-failure behavior involving large 
deformations. In addition, advances in computer hardware 
have helped to increase the size of numerical simulations 
that can be performed for risk prediction of disasters, as 
Fig. 3.6 Changing capabilities and challenges for numerical simulations
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HFA Priority for Action 4: Reduce the underlying risk factors.
HFA Core Indicator 4.1:
Disaster risk reduction is an integral objective of 
environment-related policies and plans, including 
for land use, natural resource management and 
adaptation to climate change.
Post-tsunami Recovery Strategies 




land use regulation, relocation to higher land, 1896 Sanriku 
Tsunami, 1933 Sanriku Tsunami, transition of housing 
location, urban recovery strategy
Context:
Land use mitigation is one of the most reliable strategies 
for avoiding future tsunami disaster. The Sanriku Coastal 
Area, one of the most tsunami-prone areas in Japan, located 
in the north part of the main island, was seriously damaged 
by catastrophic tsunamis in 1896, 1933, and 1960 before 
the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. The 
Japanese government prepared resettlement space on higher 
ground for the victims after the 1933 Great Sanriku Tsunami.
Before:
Fig. 4.1 illustrates the transition of housing location after the 
1933 Tsunami in Hongo District, Iwate Prefecture1.  Because 
of the relocation strategy, there is almost no building as 
of 1948, except in the higher elevations provided by the 
government. However, many buildings had been constructed 
in the vulnerable lowlands in the twentieth century.
After:
The 2011 Tsunami struck the district, washing away 
hundreds of buildings in the lowlands again (Fig. 4.2). 
In contrast, the houses on the higher resettlement area 
provided by the government after the 1933 Tsunami 
survived the destructive 2011 Tsunami.
Good practices:
The fact that the resettlement on higher ground provided by 
post-tsunami recovery planning and policy after the 1933 
Tsunami was not damaged by the 2011 Tsunami demonstrates 
the importance of land use mitigation for tsunami disaster 
reduction. This successful experience in the tsunami-prone 
coastal area should be referenced in the future.
Problems:
Although the government developed the safer resettlement 
area for residents after the 1933 Tsunami, many people 
began living in the vulnerable lower lands or returned 
to the original tsunami-prone sites until 2011. Previous 
research1 describes how several districts in Sanriku Coastal 
Area suffered from this hazardous situation because of the 
populace’s lack of tsunami risk recognition, convenience, 
or inherited lands. The recovery planning and policy for the 
land use regulation was efficient in reducing tsunami risk in 
one sense, but it was not a mandatory strategy that required 
people to live only in the safe area.
Fig. 4.2 Building Damage in Hongo after the 2011 Tsunami (left) and
              Pre-tsunami (right)2
Fig. 4.1 Change of Housing Location in Hongo, Touni Village (1948–2010)1
1 Murao, O., and Isoyama, S. (2012). Transition of Housing Location in Villages in Iwate Prefecture after the Sanriku Tsunamis in 1896 and 1933, Joint Conference Proceedings of 
  9th International Conference on Urban Earthquake Engineering (9CUEE) and 4th Asia Conference on Earthquake Engineering (4ACEE) (CD-ROM), 1877-1882, Tokyo, Japan.
2 Geospatial Information Authority of Japan. Retrieved from http://saigai.gsi.go.jp/h23taiheiyo-ok/photo/photo_dj/index.html. 39
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HFA Core Indicator 4.1:
Disaster risk reduction is an integral objective of 
environment-related policies and plans, including 
for land use, natural resource management and 
adaptation to climate change.
Integrated Perspective of Civil 




reconstruction plan, Oshika Peninsula, land use, residents’ 
intentions, coastal levee
Context:
The 2011 tsunami damaged vast coastal areas of Japan, 
including many fishing villages, which are regarded as a 
significant part of a cultural tradition in Japan, a maritime 
nation. The fishing industry has supported the revival of 
small fishing villages step-by-step, although some of these 
villages are faced with the threat of desolation. On the 
other hand, large villages, which also have functions other 
than being a place of residence and/or a part of the fishing 
industry; i.e., the commercial industry, tourism, fishery 
processing and ship building are facing another difficulty, 
such as losing their centrality. 
Before:
Ayukawa is a largest fishing village of Oshika Peninsula, 
in Ishinomaki, Miyagi Prefecture. Up until the 1970, 
the village prospered with the whaling industry. Today, 
however, tourism is an important industry for the village 
besides fishing. The 7.7-m tsunami heavily devastated the 
village’s industries, commercial and tourism facilities, and 
houses at low elevations. The earthquake also caused land 
subsistence of up to 1.2 m in this area.
After:
According to the reconstruction plan for Ayukawa made 
by a contracted civil engineering consultant, new, higher 
residential areas for the relocation will be segmented into 
four areas with 30 to 40 households each. An opinion 
survey shows that 70% of the victims want to move to the 
western area, which is separate from the existing eastern 
residential area. This indicates that they did not find the 
reconstruction of the village center appealing. This breaking 
up of the community and separation between old and new 
residential areas casts a shadow over the future of the 
village. The isolation of the new residential area from the 
existing village functions, including the commercial and 
tourism industries, as well as the current residential areas, 
will decrease the sustainability of the town. Moreover, the 
TP3 + 6.0 m high coastal levee separates the harbor area 
from the residential area (Fig. 4.3).
Good practices:
Tohoku University IRIDeS4 and Y-GSA Kojima studio 
formulated an alternative (Fig. 4.4) by integrating civil 
engineering, architecture and urban planning.
-Attractive new town center: The new town center is 
located on the artillery battery-shaped hill, which smoothly 
combines the raised road and the coastal levee. The cross 
section is accented with old streets leading to the hillside 
temple, where residents can worship their ancestors.
-Compact land use: The new residential area adjoins the 
existing residential area in the eastern part of town.
-Multifunctional interface of levee: The gradually widening 
stairs and grass slopes are designed to provide access to 
the wharf (TP + 1.5 m) from the commercial area.
-Bringing relevant parties5 into agreement and building 
consensus with local residents.
The local government executed another opinion survey after 
sharing the information of this alternative with the citizens. 
The results showed that 45% of residents want to move to 
the west, much lower then the 70% reported previously, and 
55% want to move to the east.
Problems:
The prefectural government, the main authority overseeing 
the coastal levee development, was unable to decide on a 
clear direction, and as a result, the project was delayed. It 
also led to insufficient communication with residents, which 
biased the results of surveys about their new homes.
3  TP : Tokyo Peil. The height of coastal levee is indicated by T.P.
4  IRIDeS: International Research Institute of Disaster Science, Project officer : Onoda, Y.(Architecture), Hirano, K.(Civil Engineering), et al.
5  Local government means Ishinomaki City and Miyagi Prefecture. We coordinated some reconstruction project; river embankment, coastal levee, road, housing project.
6  Model made by Kazuhiro Kojima studio of Yokohama Graduate School of Architecture
Fig. 4.3 Proposed master plan for Ayukawa Fig. 4.4 Proposed plan for the east side of Ayukawa6
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HFA Core Indicator 4.2:
Social development policies and plans are being 
implemented to reduce the vulnerability of 
populations most at risk.
Measures for People 




elderly people, Guidelines for Evacuation Support of 
People Requiring Assistance During a Disaster, evacuation, 
emergency network
Context:
It is vital for the elderly and disabled to be supported and 
assisted by neighbors in immediately evacuating from 
disastrous situations. The government and neighboring 
communities must strive to establish a framework for 
managing the various aspects of this issue.
Before:
To support such community activities, the Cabinet Office 
released the Guidelines for Evacuation Support of People 
Requiring Assistance During a Disaster in 2005 and the 
Preparation of Measures for Supporting Persons Requiring 
Assistance During a Disaster, which contains case studies 
from recent disasters, in 2007. They were also supposed to 
support municipal governments in producing overall plans. 
The 2005 Guidelines document consists of the following 
five activities.
1.  Improving the information communications system
•　Announcement of evacuation preparation information
•　Establishment of a support unit for people requiring 
      assistance
•　Secure communications through various means such as 
      the Internet and emergency call message service
2.  Sharing of information concerning people requiring 
     assistance during a disaster
•　Collection and sharing of information on people 
      requiring assistance in various ways
•　Promotion of exceptional use of social-welfare-related 
      personal information to prepare evacuation support systems
3.  Creating a tangible evacuation support plan for 
      people requiring assistance during a disaster
•　Creation of an evacuation support plan for each 
      individual requiring assistance
•　Recognition of the importance of making communities 
      resilient to disasters
4.  Assistance at evacuation centers
•　Establishment of an information desk for people 
      requiring assistance at evacuation centers
•　Establishment of welfare evacuation centers
5.  Collaboration among related organizations
•　Continuity of welfare services in disaster situations
•　Wide-area support of health nurses
•　Establishment of a committee on evacuation support for 
      people requiring assistance at the municipal level
After:
Fig. 4.5 indicates the number of casualties, by age, due to 
the 2011Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and 
the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake. Both exhibit a similar 
tendency of the death toll by age in that the ratio of the 
older populace is higher than that of the younger. However, 
the ratio in the 2011 event is remarkably higher than that in 
the 1995 Earthquake. The deaths from the 1995 Earthquake 
were caused largely by building collapse, so a dwelling’s 
structural type and age were significant.  In contrast, 
the 2011 deaths were caused largely by the tsunami, so 
evacuation methods from the vulnerable area to safer places 
were critical. Thus, residents’ age or health condition was 
an important factor affecting their fate. Following the 
guidelines, many districts had striven for strong community 
assistance for such people, but not all community plans 
worked well because of the size of affected areas and 
geographical conditions.
Good practices:
There were many elderly people needing assistance in 
shelters after the tsunami. Homehelpers in Japan dispatched 
supporters for them, and because of keeping accurate 
records of the elders’ information, that plan worked well4.
Problems:
The Cabinet Office8 noted problems in each response phase 
clarified by the event, as follows:
Before: lack of supporting systems, including acceptance 
of people and organizations, lack of dissemination of the 
procedures, shortage of helpers, shortage of previous drills.
Emergency response: no list of the elderly, not knowing 
how to use the lists, no guidelines, no information on 
evacuation for the elderly.
At the shelters after the emergency response: difficulty 
in continuing to live with other people, lack of shelters, 
limitation of response systems to the elderly, unsatisfactory 
health care, lack of information and materials, insufficient 
support by local governments because of damage, 
difficulties faced by infants and expectant mothers.
Fig. 4.5 Casualties, by Age, due to the 2011Great East Japan Earthquake and 
              Tsunami and the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake7
7 The Cabinet Office (2011). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h23/bousai2011/html/honbun/2b_sanko_siryo_06.htm.
8 The Cabinet Office (2012). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hisaisyagyousei/youengosya/h24_kentoukai. 41
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HFA Core Indicator 4.3:
Economic and productive sectoral policies and 
plans have been implemented to reduce the 
vulnerability of economic activities.
Enhancement of Business 




business continuity plans, business continuity management, 
resiliency
Context:
A business continuity plan (BCP), is defined as “a plan 
describing the policy, systems, procedures, etc. by which 
enterprises can avoid suspension of their critical business 
or resume business quickly if their business is interrupted, 
even when unexpected situations arise, including natural 
disasters such as major earthquakes, communicable disease 
pandemics, terrorist acts, serious accidents, disruption 
of supply chains and abrupt changes in the business 
environment9.” The importance of an organization having 
a BCP had been particularly discussed in Japan since the 
terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 2011. The 
main concept of a BCP is shown in Fig. 4.6.
Before:
The Cabinet Office released the first version of the “Business 
Continuity Guidelines” in 2005. The guidelines strongly 
recommended that organizations develop their BCPs, and 
the diffusion rate of BCPs has been steadily increasing. 
The guidelines were updated in 2009 to include responses 
to pandemic influenza and so on. The Cabinet Office 
continuously conducted “Surveys on Companies’ Status 
on Business Continuity” in 2007, 2009 and 2011. In 2009, 
before the Great East Japan Earthquake (hereinafter GEJE), 
27.6% of large-scale companies and 12.6% of mid-sized 
companies had completed their BCPs (Fig. 4.6).
After:
The GEJE severely influenced companies located in the 
damaged areas, but also affected companies throughout 
Japan. The above-mentioned survey by the Cabinet Office 
in November 2011 revealed the status of 5,409 companies 
throughout Japan, and is summarized as follows:
(1) The ratio of companies whose important business was 
disrupted by the GEJE was 34.5% (43.8% as for large-
scale company).
(2) Reasons for disruption (multiple answers permitted) 
were: electric power supply: 54.8%, traffic systems 
and roads: 37.8%, telephone and internet: 29.9%, 
employees: 28.0%, machinery, facilities: 26.6%, 
suppliers: 25.6%, water: 25.4%
As of November 2011, eight months after the GEJE, 45.8% 
of large-scale companies had completed their BCPs (Fig. 
4.6); a 19.8 percent-point increase from 2009. The rate 
for mid-sized companies was 20.8%; an 8.2 percent-point 
increase.
Good practices:
Oil Plant Natori Co. Ltd., a waste oil treatment company 
in Miyagi Prefecture, released its BCP in January 2011. 
Instead of self-refining, they partly outsourced the process 
to a different company in another prefecture, assuming the 
damage on refining plants by tsunami. It reopened after a 
one-week interruption following the disaster by outsourcing. 
A similar case was Suzuki Kogyo Co. Ltd. in Miyagi 
Prefecture, which operates waste treatment business. By 
outsourcing to another company in an adjacent prefecture, 
they recovered their main business within a week after the 
GEJE and started accepting tsunami debris. Their rapid 
recovery was very supportive to the damaged area because 
they devoted themselves to cleaning up the debris and waste 
around the damaged coastal area.
Problems:
First, only a small number of companies in the area affected 
by the GEJE had BCPs. Second, not all BCPs functioned 
well after the event because the BCPs were not prepared 
for severe incidents that require “alternative strategies”, 
including a substitute business site. Finally, BCPs did not 
efficiently function because they had not accounted for 
supply chain continuity (See Topic 23). 
9    Cabinet Office “Business Continuity Guidelines 3rd version”, 2014
10  Source: same as note 9
Fig. 4.6 Concept of a BCP10
Fig. 4.7 Diffusion of BCPs (Large-scale Companies)9
42
HFA Core Indicator 4.3:
Economic and productive sectoral policies and 
plans have been implemented to reduce the 
vulnerability of economic activities.




disruption of supply, supply chain management, business 
continuity management
Context:
In the production process in Japan, external dependency 
and outsourcing have grown as part of efforts toward 
rationalization and efficiency. Much of the production 
of parts and raw materials is outsourced, and the supply 
of essential utilities such as electricity, gas, water, and 
telecommunications depends on external providers. As 
a result of this dependency, even if a company sustained 
limited damage, the company would unavoidably have 
to halt its own activities almost simultaneously with 
their suppliers who suffered serious damage. Moreover, 
since these suppliers are increasingly dependent on other 
companies’ activities, the supply chain becomes longer and 
more complex.
Damage:
After the Great East Japan Earthquake (hereinafter 
GEJE), disruptions of this long, complex supply chain had 
considerable influence on the production capabilities of 
many companies that suffered no direct damage from the 
GEJE. About one month after the GEJE, from April 8 to 
15, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) 
conducted its “Emergency survey on the actual status of 
industries after the GEJE”, which was directed at 80 major 
companies (55 in manufacturing and 25 in retail/service). 
Of the manufacturing businesses located in the damaged 
areas, 64% had already restored their production bases; 26% 
estimated that they would be restored by the middle of July; 
and 3% estimated that restoration would require from six 
months to less than one year.
Regarding the reasons for difficulty in obtaining raw 
materials and parts/components (multiple answers), 88% 
of companies in the raw materials-producing industries 
cited “damage to the suppliers we procure from” and 42% 
cited “damage to the suppliers supplying the companies we 
procure from,” while 82% and 91%, respectively, of the 
companies of the processing industries cited these reasons. 
These responses indicate that the processing industries were 
strongly impacted by events two levels up the supply chain.
METI also conducted a second survey from June 14 to July 
1, surveying 123 major enterprises (65 in manufacturing and 
58 in retail/service). This represents a period around three 
and a half months after the GEJE. According to this survey, 
out of 91 production bases of manufacturing companies that 
were directly damaged by the earthquake, tsunami or both, 
93% had already been restored by this time. Regarding 
production levels, 80% had regained or surpassed pre-
earthquake levels. Of the remaining 20% who replied that 
their production levels were still lower than before the 
earthquake, some 70% said they expected to return to pre-
earthquake production levels before the end of 2011. The 
second survey found that, compared to the April survey, the 
proportion of materials industries responding that there were 
no alternate suppliers fell from 12% to zero, while these 
figures fell from 48% to 18% for processing industries11. 
The processing industries, which have a longer supply chain 
above them, were indeed more strongly affected by indirect 
damage from the earthquake, but their recovery progressed 
during the intervening three months.
After:
Many enterprises were not struck directly but faced a 
disruption in the supply of essential parts or components. 
Their response fell under three general approaches: (A) 
assisting in the recovery of their damaged suppliers; (B) 
acquiring alternate sources of procurement for unobtainable 
parts and components; and (C) redrawing specifications 
so that the unobtainable parts and components need not 
be used. From these, the companies would choose one or 
several options that would solve their problems the quickest.
In June 2011, METI’s Industrial Competitiveness Subcommittee 
of the Industrial Structure Council released a report12 that put 
forth the following five directions as measures for strengthening 
its position:
1) Use of multiple production bases for critical parts and 
materials, decentralization of these production bases and 
alternate production on other production lines.
2) Restructuring and forming joint businesses to 
decentralize the production bases on a nationwide level.
3) Alternate supply with multiple suppliers.
4) Organize and commonalize specifications and parts; 
integrate upstream and downstream industries.
5) Reorganize BCPs to address the entire supply chain, 
including clients.
11  Multiple answers were permitted if a company used multiple materials or parts/components.
12  “Problems and Responses Regarding Japan’s Industrial Competitiveness after the GEJE – Moving beyond a Crisis of Unprecedented Hollowing Out”
Fig. 4.8 Reasons for Difficulty in Obtaining Raw Materials and Parts/
             Components (one month after the earthquake)
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HFA Core Indicator 4.4:
Planning and management of human settlements 
incorporate disaster risk reduction elements, 
including enforcement of building codes.
Promotion of the Earthquake-
proof Retrofit of Buildings 




1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, building damage, 
earthquake-proof retrofit, seismic reinforcement
Context:
More than 100,000 buildings were severely damaged 
and roughly 150,000 were moderately damaged by the 
Hyogoken-Nanbu (Kobe) Earthquake on January 17, 1995. 
Most human casualties were caused by building collapse, 
and the building damage conditions depended on structural 
type and construction period (Fig. 4.9)13. Specifically, 
buildings constructed after the 1971 and 1981 amendments 
of the 1950 Building Standard Law were less damaged.
Consequently, that event indicated the importance of 
strengthening buildings to reduce future building collapse risk.
Before:
The Act on Promotion of Earthquake-proof Retrofit of 
Buildings was passed in 1995 after the Kobe Earthquake. 
It was amended in 2006 after the 2004 Niigata-ken 
Chuetsu Earthquake. The act serves to increase the ratio 
of earthquake-resistant buildings from 75% in 2005 to 
90% by 2015. Fig. 4.10 shows the change in the number of 
earthquake-resistant buildings in a 2010 report released by 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism14. 
Each local government had supported to strengthen 
buildings in the jurisdiction.
After:
The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake’s building damage 
was not as great as that by the Tsunami or by the 1995 
Great Kobe Earthquake because of the relationship between 
the structural natural period and seismic characteristics. 
However, slightly damaged buildings, including destruction 
of non-structural elements, were widely distributed.
Having strong misgivings about building damage due 
to the estimated destructive earthquake occurring in the 
Nankai Trough, the government amended the act again in 
2013. The amended act requires the evaluation of seismic 
capacity of lrge-scale public facilities and publication of 
that information, among other actions.
Good practices:
Learning from previous disasters, the government passed 
and repeatedly amended the act. This cycle is vital for 
future disaster management. Setting a quantitative goal for 
the proportion of earthquake-resistant buildings in near 
future would also be effective.
Problems:
Some residents are not willing to strengthen vulnerable 
houses because of (1) uncertainty of the cost, (2) doubt 
about the building strength after the retrofit, and (3) the idea 
that it is inefficient to spend much money for reinforcing 
old buildings.
Fig. 4.9 Damage Ratio of Wood-frame Buildings by the 1995 Kobe 
Earthquake Classified by the Construction Period13









































Total Number of Houses     : about 47,0 million
        Earthquake-proof         : about  35,5 million
        Non-earthquake-proof : about  11,5 million
The ratio of earthquake-resistant 
houses: about 75%
*Estimated record in 2003
2003   →  2008
Rebuilding: 0,9 million houses
Retrofit: 0,3 million houses
Total Number of Houses    : about 49,5 million
        Earthquake-proof        : about  39,0 million
        Non-earthquake-proof : about  10,5 million
*Estimated record in 2008
The ratio of earthquake-resistant 
houses: about 79%
Total Number of Houses     : about 49,5 million
        Earthquake-proof        : about  44,5 million
        Non-earthquake-proof : about     5,0 million
*The goal was set in 2005
The ratio of earthquake-resistant 







Fig. 4.10 Change in the Number of Earthquake-resistant Buildings (2003-2015)10
13 Yamazaki, F., and Murao, O. (2000). “Vulnerability Functions for Japanese Buildings Based on Damage Data due to the 1995 Kobe Earthquake,” Implications of Recent 
   Earthquakes on Seismic Risk, Series of Innovation in Structures and Construction, Vol. 2, pp. 91-102, Imperial College Press.
14  Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (2010). Retrieved on [date] from http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000188412.pdf.44
HFA Core Indicator 4.4:
Planning and management of human settlements 
incorporate disaster risk reduction elements, 
including enforcement of building codes.
Public Housing for the 
Mitigation on the Negative 
Impact of Environmental 
Transition on the Victims
25
Keywords:
public housing for victims, actual housing needs, quality of 
living condition, community
Context:
Municipalities affected by the 2011 tsunami are responsible 
for providing land and public housing for the victims 
based on the national reconstruction policy (Fig. 4.11). A 
vast number of projects must be implemented in a short 
period of time with a limited budget; thus, there is little 
room to consider quality. Referring to previous disaster 
experiences, including the Great Hanshin Earthquake, the 
environmental transition of the victims is a critical phase 
of the reconstruction. Victims face an unstable situation 
after moving from temporary housing to new settlements; 
therefore, they require appropriate support. In the case of 
the Great Hanshin Earthquake, numerous solitary deaths 
were reported after victims moved to public housing.
Before:
The area affected by the 2011 tsunami had problems 
associated with an aging and decreasing population even 
before the disaster. On the other hand, these communities 
have sufficient social resources to support older people.
After:
The damage not only exacerbates these difficulties but also 
changes the community itself. Spending more than 3 years 
in temporary housing is sufficient time for a community to 
deteriorate. On the other hand, victims are able to receive 
social support while living in temporary housing; however, 
this support will be cut off after they move to permanent 
housing.
Good practices:
The amount of public housing was estimated based on an 
opinion survey of the victims; however, the results of these 
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surveys are sometimes unreliable. For instance, the number 
of people who wish to live in public housing was found 
to be exaggerated. Thus, both the amount and quality of 
public housing should be controlled carefully. In the case 
of Shichigahama Town, which had good collaboration with 
advisers16, the municipality established a good strategy for 
the planning, as follows:
1) Adequate information sharing with the victims in the 
early phase to reduce the number of public housing units 
that they need to build (Fig. 4.12); 2) establishing good 
relationships between the existing community and relocated 
victims; 3) community-oriented planning of the public 
housing to encourage communication between residents 
(Fig. 4.13); 4) a participatory process of planning and 
organizing the residents’ association; and 5) conducting a 
rational management process supported by the prefecture.
Problems:
The construction boom in the area affected by the 2011 
tsunami is leading to skyrocketing construction costs. 
These escalating costs make elaborate designs, for which 
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In the group that people 
reconstruct on original 
location, the damage on 
land ahd house is small.
The people who choose to live in 
public housing is older and the size 
of their family is also small.
15   Tsukuda. H, Onoda, Y., The situation of housing reconstruction from the disaster, Conference of UN. Habitat and IRIDeS,March 14th 2014, Sendai, Japan.
16  Onoda,Y.(Architecture and Urban Planning, Tohoku Univ.), Miyagi, T.(Natural Disaster Science, Tohoku Gakuni Univ.) Miyagi, S.(Landscape, Nara Women’s Univ.)
17  Onoda, Y., Kanno, M.,(2005), New Alternatives for Public Housing in Japan, EDRA, 36, The Environmental Design Research Association, Vancouver, pp.61-67
18  Atlier Hitoshi Abe (2014).
Fig. 4.11  Accommodation situation after the 2011 tsunami15
Fig. 4.12  Change in victims’ demand for accomodation15
Fig. 4.13  Diagram of community-oriented housing17
Fig. 4.14  Image of new public housing building18
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Keywords:
urban recovery strategy, land use regulation, relocation, 
concentration, avoiding, slowing, steering, blocking, 
compacted terraces and berms, reinforcement
Context:
Post-disaster recovery is a significant process for rebuilding 
a society with new, improved disaster reduction systems for 
the future. The Tohoku Region coastal areas had previously 
experienced several huge tsunamis and took measures to 
mitigate tsunamis’ damage through the twentieth century. 
However the March 11, 2011, Tsunami struck them again 
and washed away the residential areas. Every district 
examined and designed its recovery plan according to its 
circumstances, and they are exploring strategies to build 
their new towns in the context of certain problems.
Before:
As described in Topic 19, the government developed inland 
resettlements for the 1933 Sanriku Tsunami victims, but 
houses again increased in the lower elevations by the ocean, 
only to be washed away. The death toll including missing 
people was 21,000 as of March 26, 2013. 
After:
The number of damaged municipalities by the Tsunami was 62, 
and 43 municipalities had released their post-tsunami recovery 
plans for future tsunami damage mitigation as of May 2012.
According to a survey for 208 damaged districts conducted 
by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and 
Tourism19, the post-tsunami recovery plans can be classified 
into five types and comprise four mitigation systems: (1) 
relocation as a land use mitigation system; (2) levee to 
block tsunamis; (3) compacted terraces and berms to avoid, 
slow, or steer tsunamis; and (4) tsunami mitigation design 
for facilities. The five classifications are as follows (Fig 
4.15):
A.   Relocation (127)
B.   Concentration (6)
C.   Compacted terraces and berms (19)
D.   Relocation and compacted terraces and berms (18)
E.  Reconstruction on the original site with facility 
       reinforcement (38)
Good practices:
Every damaged district in Japan devised its recovery 
plan that reduces future tsunami risk based on previous 
experience. Public involvement has been recognized as an 
especially significant factor in devising recovery plans since 
the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake.
Problems:
Now that the damaged municipalities have announced their 
recovery plans, each local government must implement 
it .  However, they encounter several challenges in 
implementing actual projects, depending upon the regional 
situation, such as the following examples:
•  Disagreements between governments and residents 
about the destruction of a beautiful piece of scenery by 
levee construction, or levees’ adequate assurance of safety
•　Shortage of available land for relocation
•　Shortage of construction materials and workers for the 
      extraordinarily large damaged area 
•　Construction costs
Fig. 4.15 Regional Urban Recovery Types Proposed after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 3
19 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (2012). Retrieved from http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000209868.pdf (revised for this material by the author).
HFA Core Indicator 4.5:
Disaster risk reduction measures are integrated 
with post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation 
processes.
Post-tsunami Recovery for Risk 
Reduction after the 2011 Great East 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
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HFA Core Indicator 4.6:
Procedures are in place to assess the disaster risk
impacts of major development projects, 
especially infrastructure.
Destruction of Coastal Levees 




Level 1 and 2 tsunamis, return period, design tsunami, 
disaster mitigation, robust structures
Context:
The 2011 tsunami overtopped almost all the coastal 
defense facilities in Iwate and Miyagi prefectures, such as 
breakwaters, inlet gates and coastal levees, destroyed assets 
as well as facilities and resulted in an enormous loss of life. 
In June 2011, the Central Disaster Management Council 
(CDMC) established the following tsunami countermeasure 
policies: 1) to classify the tsunamis into two levels, namely 
Level 1 tsunamis that occur at a high frequency and have 
the potential to cause extensive damage, and Level 2 
tsunamis that occur at a very low frequency but with a 
maximum magnitude, and that have the potential to cause 
catastrophic damage; 2) to protect human lives and assets 
from Level 1 tsunamis using defense facilities; and 3) to 
protect human lives from Level 2 tsunamis with the highest 
priority through effective evacuation and to adopt integrated 
mitigations using all possible methods. This is an important 
paradigm shift from disaster prevention to mitigation based 
on the lessons learned from the 2011 tsunami.
Following the policies of the CDMC, in July 2011, 
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and 
Tourism (MLIT) established the following guidelines for 
reconstruction of the coastal levees: 1) the return period of a 
Level 1 tsunami is to be in the range of several tens of years 
to one hundred and several tens of years. This corresponds 
to the guidelines of another prevailing flood disaster. The 
return period is 10 to 50 years depending on the importance 
of the hinterland of the rivers, and 200 years for the Tone 
River, which has potential to inundate Tokyo. A tsunami 
with a specified return period is defined as the design 
tsunami. The height of the design tsunami is to be adjusted 
with the management and available utilities of rivers, 
harbors and fishing ports. It should be noted that the there 
is a rather wide range of selectivity for the return period 
in the guideline. 2) The height of the coastal levee is to be 
determined from the higher elevation of the design tsunami 
and design storm surge. 3) The reconstructed levees are to 
be robust even for the overtopping of Level 2 tsunamis, 
because more frequent disasters including Level 1 tsunamis 
and storm surges have to be blocked by the surviving levees, 
and because mitigation by the surviving levees for the next 
Level 2 tsunami attack is expected. This expectation means 
that the reconstructed levees are required to maintain their 
robustness during the return period for Level 2 tsunamis, 
which is estimated to be 1000 years in the Sendai Bay area. 
This is discussed later in Problems.
Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures immediately 
received the guidelines and started the procedure to 
determine the levee height. The prefectures determined the 
return period of the design tsunami to be approximately 
150 years uniformly for all of the coasts, and included the 
1896 Great Sanriku tsunami, which killed at least 20,000 
people worst in this area. The determined return period 
is at the high end of the range in the guideline. Miyagi 
Prefecture divided the 258 km coast into 22 units and 
selected the design tsunami for each unit. The 1896 tsunami 
is selected for most units, while the 1960 Chilean tsunami 
is selected for the leeside of the Ojika peninsula and for the 
Matsushima bay. The Ishinomaki coast and the Southern 
Sendai bay coast also selected the 1896 tsunami which is, 
however, lower than the design storm surges because these 
two coasts are in the shaded area by the peninsula for the 
1896 tsunami. The design storm surges determined he levee 
height of 7.2 m above the mean sea level. Miyagi Prefecture 
determined a levee height of all the units in September 
2011, started to discuss with the related municipalities, and 
reached an agreement for all but a few units.
Fol lowing the  prefectura l  p lan  on coas ta l  levee 
reconstruction, municipalities in the Sendai bay area 
developed an urban plan that specifies a disaster danger 
zone behind the levee in which people are prohibited 
from residing and are moved to inland areas according 
to the large-scale movement plan for disaster prevention. 
Residential areas are specified as locations where the 
inundation depth for Level 2 tsunamis is less than 2 m. To 
expand the area, the inland road will be raised because the 
highway located about 4 km from the coast stopped further 
inundation of the 2011 tsunami. Municipalities along the 
Sanriku coast mostly selected higher areas instead of inland 
areas to move because plains at the bay head area are 
narrow and are the major route of the tsunami run-up. These 
urban plans follow up the CDMC policies on the mitigation 
for the Level 2 tsunamis.
Before:
The coasts heavily damaged by the 2011 tsunami are 
classified into three coasts: the Sanriku coast, the Sendai 
bay coast, and the Joban coast. The Sanriku coast is 
characterized by the train of submerged valleys that 
amplifies the tsunami height due to the effect of energy 
concentration and resonance. Furthermore, large tsunamis 
have repeatedly occurred off the Sanriku coast, including 
the 1896 and 1933 tsunamis. The Sendai bay coast is 
bounded by the Ojika peninsula from the Sanriku coast and 
characterized by fluvial plains, big rivers, sandy coasts and 
shallow water. Large cities, such as Sendai, Ishinomaki, 
Shiogama, etc. are located on the plains. Especially, 
Ishinomaki was developed as a harbor city along the 
Kitakami River, which concentrates the population near the 
waterfront of the river and sea with relatively low levees to 
avoid disrupting harbor activity. Ishinomaki is vulnerable 
to large tsunami attacks. The height of the 1896 and 1933 
tsunamis along the Sendai bay coast was much lower than 
that along the Sanriku coast because the tsunami source 
areas off the Sanriku coast and the peninsula functioned 
as a natural breakwater. Therefore, people living along the 
Sendai bay coast were not accustomed to large tsunami 
attacks. Major hazards in this area over the last 150 years 
are therefore not tsunamis but storm surges. However, if we 
look well into the past, the Sendai bay plains experienced 
deep inland inundation due to the 869 and 1611 tsunamis.
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After:
The 2011 tsunami source has not only large vertical 
displacement but also large horizontal extension from off 
the Sanriku coast to off the Chiba coast, and it produced a 
gigantic tsunami. The maximum tsunami trace height reaches 
up to 40 m above the mean sea level along the Sanriku coast 
and 15 m along the Sendai bay coast. The tsunami overtopped 
almost all coastal defense facilities, took numerous lives 
and destroyed assets as well as facilities. Destruction of the 
coastal levees proceeded in two steps: 1) the impact from the 
first wave broke weak structures, such as parapets, joints, thin 
slabs of concrete, moved strong rigid-frame structures, and/
or eroded backside mounts via overtopped jets; 2) the return 
flow of a huge amount of inundated water concentrated at 
the break points from the first step, rivers, and ditches and 
resulted in large-scale scouring. Fig.4.16 and Fig.4.17 show 
aerial photographs of the Yamamoto coast before and after 
the tsunami. T-shaped jetties and steep slope levees with a 
parapet were installed along the coast because it had been 
suffering from serious coastal erosion. The first wave of 
the tsunami initially broke the parapets and thin slab. The 
return flow then concentrated at the break points and caused 
massive erosion behind breach points, an area referred to as 
the tsunami bay. The return flow also caused long erosion 
behind levees, which is referred to as a tsunami channel. To 
avoid this kind of large-scale scouring, appropriate control of 
the return flow is necessary.
Good practices:
1)  The paradigm shift from disaster prevention to 
mitigation is necessary for catastrophic disasters. Not 
everything can be secured against huge hazards by 
the facilities. Prioritizing the security for human lives 
enables effective mitigation.
2)   Robustness of the defense facilities for Level 2 tsunamis 
is necessary for important structures but not for 
every structure. For example, the Kamaishi tsunami 
breakwater was constructed at the bay mouth with 
a maximum depth of 63 m. The breakwater cost 12 
billion USD and should last 30 years. It was designed 
based on Level 1 tsunamis, such as the 1896 tsunami, 
and was completed in 2009. Although the 2011 tsunami 
overtopped the break water and blew off some caissons 
at the shallow water and opening, the other was almost 
safe. The Port and Airport Research Institute (PARI) 
evaluated the mitigation by the breakwater and found 
that the inundation height was decreased by 30% and 
transmission of the tsunami was delayed 6 min. The 
breakwater was robust. The repair costs are estimated 
to be 49 billion USD.
Problems:
1)  Setting of the return period of Level 1 tsunamis 
uniformly at the high end of the range, 150 years, which 
is close to that for Tokyo’s defenses, may be excessive, 
especially for ageing communities. Other effective 
mitigations should also be considered.
2)   Most of the funding for the reconstruction of the defense 
facilities and urban areas comes from the national treasury 
without considering the costs and benefits. It was an urgent 
political decision and necessary to start the recovery 
process as soon as possible. However, at this stage, 
effective use of the budget should be used effectively is 
necessary to avoid making unnecessary defenses.
Fig. 4.16  The Yamamoto coast before the tsunami, photographed by MLIT 
                 in March 2010
Fig. 4.17  The Yamamoto coast after the tsunami, photographed by Kyodo 
                News, on March 19, 2011
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Keywords:
post-tsunami recovery projects, tsunami simulation
Context:
To support local governments to arrange proper regional 
plans for tsunami disaster reduction, the Japanese 
government published the “Tsunami Disaster Estimation 
Manual” and “Guideline to Strengthen Tsunami Disaster 
Management in Local Disaster Prevention Plans” in 1997, 
followed by the “Tsunami and Tidal Wave Hazard Map 
Making Manual (2004)” and “Guideline for Management of 
Tsunami Evacuation Buildings (2005).”
Before:
Considering these guidelines, local governments in the 
damaged areas had developed their disaster management 
systems according to regional conditions. However, the 
2011 Earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tōhoku was greater 
than expected, and some management systems failed to 
work well.
After:
Each municipality performed two types of tsunami 
simulations, depending on the occurrence risk to devise 
recovery plans for resettlement. The Japanese government20 
prepared several projects (Fig. 4.18) to support their plan 




HFA Core Indicator 4.6 good practices and problems are 
those previously described for Topic 19.
Fig. 4.18 Urban Recovery Projects at a Glance after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami20
20 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (2013). Retrieved from http://www.mlit.go.jp/report/fukkou-index.html.
HFA Core Indicator 4.6:
Procedures are in place to assess the disaster risk
impacts of major development projects, 
especially infrastructure.
Comprehensive Post-tsunami 
Recovery after the 2011 Great East 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
28
Fig. 4.19 Seawall Under Construction in Natori City Fig. 4.20 Town Development in Taro Town
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HFA Priority for Action 5: Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.
HFA Core Indicator 5.1:
Strong policy, technical and institutional 
capacities and mechanisms for disaster risk 
management, with a disaster risk reduction 
perspective, are in place.
Measures and Agenda for Large-
scale Disasters in Japan: from the 
Perspective of Personal Information 
and Disaster Prevention Education
29
Keywords:
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, Personal Information 
Protection Law, local knowledge
Context:
Because of the several disasters such as typhoons, 
earthquakes, tsunamis, and heavy snowfall in Japan, the 
country has suffered a great loss of people’s lives and 
assets and a massive economic loss. On the basis of these 
experiences and lessons learned, disaster-related acts, 
policies, and legal frameworks have been developed and 
enacted to prepare for and respond to disasters. 
Before:
The 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act was enacted 
on the basis of the experiences of the 1959 Typhoon 
Isewan. Before that, the national and local government 
roles and responsibilities had not been stated clearly. 
The Act regulated the roles and authorities of each level 
of government for disaster risk reduction, response, and 
recovery to secure the victims’ welfare and social order 
by protecting citizens’ lives and assets from disasters. 
Municipalities have the responsibility of establishing 
a disaster response office; however, to respond to a 
massive disaster (causing damages beyond the capacity of 
prefectures and municipalities), the national government is 
required to establish a disaster response office to provide 
the necessary assistance.
After the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, major revisions to 
the Act included 1) easing the conditions of establishing 
the disaster response office and strengthening the disaster 
response office’s authority; 2) mayors’ issuing a request for 
the deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) 
to the governor and reporting the disaster situation to the 
Director-General of the Defense Agency; 3) traffic control; 
and 4) training of the local voluntary organizations for 
disaster risk reduction, including measures for the elderly 
and persons with disabilities.
After:
The experiences from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake 
and Tsunami revealed that the existing act was insufficient 
for response to such an unexpected disaster. The April 
2005 Personal Information Protection Law hampered the 
confirmation of people’s safety, making it difficult to obtain 
the information and pre-determine whether people would 
require extra support lives. The leaders of community-
based organizations and the chairpersons of neighborhood 
associations addressed such issues. As a result of such 
problems, the number of casualties of the elderly and persons 
with disabilities reached was double that of ordinary persons. 
  Another issue was the citizens’ lack of awareness of 
tsunamis. The areas affected by the 2011 Tsunami included 
regions with no previous tsunami experience, and a number 
of citizens there had no proper knowledge and believed that 
a tsunami poses no danger. They held such beliefs from 
their knowledge of the 1961 Chile Earthquake and were 
convinced that their residential areas were safe as they had 
no such earlier incidents.
On the basis of the lessons learned from the 2011 Tsunami, 
the Act was again revised, and local governments gained the 
authority to develop a list of affected people, specifically 
through information gathered by municipalities, and the 
information on the elderly and persons with disabilities, in 
particular, can now be submitted to relevant offices, with 
the individuals’ consent. In addition, the dissemination of 
the lessons learned and disaster education will strengthen 
the capacity for local disaster risk reduction.
Good practices:
Quick response is required after a disaster, whereas enactment 
of a law is, by its nature, a post-process. Therefore, now is the 
time to revise the fundamental act for disaster measures on 
the basis of the experiences of the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake 
and Tsunami and the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake.
In an attempt to determine the essential knowledge, for 
example, the education committee of Shizuoka Prefecture 
has established the Fundamental Education Policy of 
Disaster Presentation of Shizuoka Prefecture (2012 revision) 
to prepare for a Tokai Earthquake. The policy addresses 
several guidelines with two main purposes of education 
for disaster prevention. Beginning in preschool, the first 
purpose is to develop knowledge and understanding, 
interest, motivation and attitudes, thinking and judgment, 
and skills (social contribution, etc.). At each stage of 
maturation, the second purpose comprises developing the 
abilities of self-preservation (kindergarten to lower grades 
of elementary school), actively applying knowledge (mid-
high grade of elementary school), contributing to local 
society’s safety, understanding and responding to the 
situation (middle school), and rebuilding a safe society 
(college/university student, working people).
Problems:
Preventing municipal access to private information is the 
largest barrier constraining local networks. When the chairman 
of the municipality, who is a local community leader, is not 
concurrently a member of the public welfare committee, it is 
difficult to understand the issues of a community’s vulnerable 
people such as senior citizens.
Furthermore, a dilemma exists in that the idea of being in 
a “safe place,” handed down from olden times, continues 
in the community with no validity. This phenomenon is 
understandable for the short-term to mid-term stage of recent 
history; people might have difficulty understanding the reality 
of a once-in-a-thousand-years event. This mindset has become 
clear from the precedent that migrants to higher places have 
returned to the coast repeatedly in the Sannriku region.
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HFA Core Indicator 5.1:
Strong policy, technical and institutional 
capacities and mechanisms for disaster risk 
management, with a disaster risk reduction 
perspective, are in place.
National Preparedness 




disaster medicine, disaster base hospitals, command 
control, disaster medical-public health coordinator
Context:
The medical response after the Great Hanshin Awaji 
Earthquake was not sufficient to deal with the mass 
casualties and vast areas of damage that disrupted hospital 
functions. Preventable deaths were postulated since rapid 
search and rescue, on-site confined space medicine and 
wide-area transportation was not systematically available. 
Thus, the Japanese government established the medical 
response system including Disaster Base Hospital (DBH), 
Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), Staging Care 
Unit (SCU) and wide-area transportation, Emergency 
Medical Information System (EMIS) and disaster medical-
public health coordinator.
Before:
There were 609 DBHs under the management of the 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in Japan before 
the GEJE. Most of the tertiary hospitals were assigned as 
DBHs that provide intensive care for patients with multiple 
injuries, crush syndrome and severe burns following a 
disaster. DBHs respond to incoming and outgoing wide-
area patient transportation and provide DMATs. DBHs 
also provide medical resources to affected hospitals. The 
National Disaster Medical Center is assigned as the General 
Headquarters of the Japan DMATs. Fifty-five central DBHs 
and more than 200 DBHs were ready to dispatch a DMAT. 
A DMAT is specifically trained to deal with confined 
space medicine and wide-area transportation as well as to 
effectively assist the local headquarters. EMIS provides the 
physical and functional capacity information of hospitals 
nationwide. In 1996, Hyogo Prefecture assigned the medical 
coordinator that coordinates the various medical needs and 
resources, but only three prefectures followed suit.
After:
The system is strengthened by increasing the number of 
DBHs and DMATs. The building code of DBHs was revised 
to further strengthen seismic control and emergency lifelines. 
Hospital BCPs are also improving. Prioritization of EMIS 
to all hospitals and its daily use is now promoted. Specific 
training courses have rapidly increased the number of disaster 
medical-public health coordinators nationwide (Fig. 5.1).
Good practices:
No DBH was destroyed by the 2011 tsunami. DBHs within 
the affected area responded to the surge in medical needs 
and acted as the hub of medical-public health aids. Distant 
DBHs accepted patients from the affected area to decrease 
the medical loads of the affected area. DBHs provided 
DMATs rapidly to the affected area under control of the 
general headquarters. From March 11 to 22, 383 DMATs, 
a total of 1,800 members, were dispatched to provide 
medical assistance. SCU and wide-area transportation were 
performed for the first time since their establishment and 
saved more than 90 patients who needed hemodialysis. SCU 
worked as a pool of doctors to help nearby hospitals. EMIS 
handled the basic hospital information to assist medical 
coordination at the DMAT general headquarters.
Problems:
●  Several hospitals built on the coast were destroyed and 
    many patients and staff members were lost along with 
    their function as a safety net.
●  Hospitals had to accept the evacuees as a shelter despite 
    their damage and the surge in medical needs.
●  Lifelines of the hospitals were damaged, which impaired 
    their function.
●  Hospital workers also lost family members and property 
    because of the disaster, but had to deal with the surge in 
    medical needs.
●  Impairment of communication tools made coordinating 
    activities difficult.
●  DBHs within the affected area were paralyzed by the 
    excess requests from local hospitals and outside medical 
    assistant teams that lacked trained coordinators.
●  Health care at evacuation centers was not well prepared 
    because the recovery of local health care providers was 
    delayed.
●  DBHs that were supposed to deal with the nuclear 
    disaster were not fully functional.
●  SCU at the airport was not well equipped with supporting 
    devices and vehicles.
●  EMIS coverage was limited and failed to dispatch 
    adequate medical relief.
●  There were not enough trained medical coordinators at 
    the time of the disaster.
Fig. 5.1  Increase in the number of medical-public health
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HFA Core Indicator 5.2:
Disaster preparedness plans and contingency 
plans are in place at all administrative levels, and 
regular training drills and rehearsals are held to 
test and develop disaster response programmes.
Enhancement of Plans for 




business continuity plans of governments, operational 
continuity
Context:
To avoid suspension of critical operation, plans for 
continuity of important operation or business continuity 
plans (BCPs) in the public sector are necessary for public 
organizations as well as private enterprises, even for 
unexpected situations, including natural disasters such 
as major earthquakes, communicable disease pandemics, 
terrorist acts or serious accidents. (For private company 
BCPs, see Topic 22 of Indicator 4.3)
“The Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act” prescribes that 
ministries (including local branches) and local governments 
should keep disaster management plans in accordance 
with “the Disaster Management Basic Plan” issued by the 
Central Disaster Management Council (supported by the 
Cabinet Office). However, if these organizations suffer 
serious damage to their critical resources for important 
operations, such as personnel, government buildings, ICT 
systems, electric power supply, telecommunications, water 
and so on, they need governmental organization BCPs.
Before:
The Cabinet Office released the first version of the “Business 
Continuity Guidelines” in 20051. The guidelines were 
designed as applicable to both public organizations and 
companies. Then, in June 2007, “Business Continuity 
Guidelines for Ministries” was published, considering 
the probability of a Tokyo Inland Earthquake. Based on 
the guidelines, all ministries and agencies of the central 
government were requested to formulate their BCPs, and 
had finished them before the Great East Japan Earthquake 
(hereinafter GEJE) occurred.
For local governments, “Manual and Guidance on 
Business Continuity of Local Governments at the Time of 
Earthquake” was published in April 2010 by the Cabinet 
Office. However, formulating a BCP does not prevail 
easily, and less than half of prefectural governments 
had formulated their BCPs at the time of the GEJE. As 
for municipalities, only a limited number of the city 
governments had BCPs at that time.
Damage:
The GEJE damaged the main buildings of many local 
governments. Table 5.1 shows the damage. A total of 
273 municipalities suffered damage. Among them, 13 
municipalities had to relocate their main building and 
other 15 municipalities had to relocate a portion of 
it. Additionally, the main building of the Fukushima 
prefectural government was not usable for a while because 
of its poor antiseismic properties.
1 The newest version is “Business Continuity Guidelines, third version”, published in August 2013, available at http://www.bousai.go.jp/kyoiku/kigyou/pdf/guideline03.pdf
2  Source: News of Jiji.com, Feb.28, 2014, http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201402/2014022800541 
Damage to critical resources for important operation of local 
governments was not limited to the facilities. The mayor of 
Otsuchi Town in Iwate Prefecture was killed by the tsunami, 
and many other high-ranking officials were killed in many 
municipalities within the damaged area. The serious damage 
to facilities and loss of personnel delayed the rescue action, 
refugee support and recovery of the facilities and towns. 
The need for plans of operational continuity (i.e. BCPs) of 
local governments has been clearly realized, considering the 
high probability that Japan will be struck by major natural 
disasters in the future.
After:
The Cabinet Office conducted a review of all BCPs of 
ministries in 2012 that were prepared for a possible Tokyo 
Inland Earthquake, and serious weak points were found by 
BCP specialists in charge of the review. “BCP of the Central 
Government” was issued by the Central Disaster Management 
Council in March 2014. This plan was formulated to respond 
to the demand by the new acts for special countermeasures 
for a Tokyo Inland Earthquake (November 2013) and for 
National Resilience (December 2013).
The number of prefectures formulating BCPs increased 
after the GEJE. Approximately 60% of prefectures have 
formulated BCPs2 for earthquakes and other major disasters 
and incidents. The Cabinet Office plans to revise both the 
business continuity guideline for ministries and the manual/
guidance for local government BCPs in fiscal year 2014.
Table. 5.1  Damage from the GEJE to main buildings of local governments
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HFA Core Indicator 5.2:
Disaster preparedness plans and contingency 
plans are in place at all administrative levels, and 
regular training drills and rehearsals are held to 
test and develop disaster response programmes.
Three Coastal Districts in Iwaki 
City, Fukushima Prefecture: 
Differences Resulting from the 




neighborhood association, regional activities, disaster 
prevention
Context:
Overview of three coastal districts in Iwaki City:
Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture, is located approximately 
50 km south of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. 
There are about 33 million people in less than 500 districts. 
Coastal areas in this city were also damaged by the tsunami 
caused by the 2011 Earthquake, resulting in the deaths of 
fewer than 300 people. The population of the coastal areas 
discussed here is roughly 5,000: over 2,000 in districts A 
and C, and less than 1,000 in B. Fig. 5.2 and Table 5.2, 
respectively, present each district’s location and population. 
Table 5.3 reports disaster-related activity evaluations before 
and after the earthquake. The next section explains the 



















Fig. 5.2 Map of Iwaki City Area
poplation households damage
343,008 133,270
death 310, missing 37
completely destroyed 7,640
houses
A 2,200 660 death 85completely destroyed 
B 760 260 death 130completely destroyed 
C 1,600 700 completely destroyed 47
Iwaki City
District
Table 5.2 Overview of each district
Before:
(1) Pre-disaster activities of each district 
A: ○ There  was  an  ac t iv i ty  a t  each  d is t r ic t 
level (Gyosei-ku), block associations (Chonai-kai), 
and neighborhood associations (Tonari-gumi). This 
district has many festivals and activities organized by 
each block association.
B: △ Activi t ies  in  the la t ter  were mainly in 
the district and neighborhood associations. The only 
event was the Children’s Day Festival, which is held 
once a year in May. 
C：○ The district is divided into small towns (Buraku), 
composed of neighborhood associations and a 
district with many festivals.
(2) Preparation for disaster in each district
The “Iwaki Regional Disaster Prevention Plan” (Iwaki 
Conference on Disaster Reduction, revised 2010) had 
been enacted before the earthquake. However, efforts to 
ensure its effectiveness were left to the districts because 
this is only a “guideline.” Disaster preparedness in each 
district is as follows.
A：○ Although planning occurred in the district, block 
associations had insufficient time to effectively 
support it.
B: △ This district was the only well-known refuge
for residents.
C: ◎ District officers have created primarily a 
hazard map that was well known to residents.
After:
(1 )Communica t ion  o f  each  a rea  o f  the  d i sas te r 
immediately afterward: call for tsunami evacuation
A: ○ The mayor personally performed the call for 
evacuation. Residents escaped to the shelter while 
helping each other.
B: △ There was no particular communication plan as a 
district; it had only a refuge by neighborhood 
association unit.
C: ○ The mayor personally performed the call for 
evacuation and opened the shelter (community 
center). Then the officers gathered without a specific 
call to them because there was a tacit understanding 
that everyone should “Go to the community center, 
if there is a disaster.”
(2 )Communica t ion  o f  each  a rea  o f  the  d i sas te r 
afterward: shelter management or missing person search.
A: ○ Under the mayor’s direction, district officers kept 













Table 5.3 Activity Evaluation before and after the Earthquake
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(SE) volunteered to help make a missing persons list.
B: △ It was difficult for the district to support 
communications immediately.
C: ◎ A f t e r  p e r f o r m i n g  t h e i r  r o l e s  ( f o o d s , 
communication, health, collecting information, etc.), 
officers of districts took action to manage shelters 
and seek missing persons.
(3) Future response plans: activities for disaster prevention 
and mitigation, from the efforts of the emergency drill 
on August 31, 2013.
Iwaki City has presented for each district the “2013 
Comprehensive Disaster Training in Iwaki City.” The 
document provides an outline that includes an overview 
of training, time schedule, and publicity materials in 
each district. The districts had to revise it according to 
the actual situation for shelters and response methods.
A: ○ The emergency drill was supported at the 
block association level. The mayor conducted it, 
with three district conductors and the heads of the 
neighborhood associations. Under each conductor, 
the association head called for evacuation and 
guided residents to shelter. After the head confirmed 
the number of people displaced in the primary 
evacuation site, he reported it to each conductor.
B: △ The district asked two neighborhood associations 
to collaborate via a circular notice. The others 
were difficult to implement for the disaster drill.
C: ○ The dis t r ic t  conducted the  dr i l l  a t  the 
neighborhood association level. Thirty association 
heads had residents evacuate to the primary place 
of refuge, and reported the number of evacuated 
people to the district officers. After moving evacuees 
to the secondary shelter according to the officers’ 
instructions, officers reported the results to the mayor.
Good practices:
Daily regional activities enhance disaster prevention 
awareness and lead to involvement in creating the hazard 
map, which enables better post-disaster support by 
organizations. Furthermore, autonomous organizations 
formed by local residents (A, C) can utilize various 
functions to prevent disasters.
Problems:
Even if there is partial solidarity, such as a blood–territorial 
relationship, if the community is not active and the self-
government organization function is weak, the community’s 
disaster response capabilities before and after the earthquake 
are also weak (B).
HFA Core Indicator 5.2:
Disaster preparedness plans and contingency 
plans are in place at all administrative levels, and 
regular training drills and rehearsals are held to 
test and develop disaster response programmes.
Pre-Disaster Activities to Preserve 




preservation of local historical materials, pre-disaster 
networking, 2003 Miyagi Earthquake, 2011 Great East 
Japan Earthquake, cooperative activities to preserve and 
pass on historical and cultural heritage
Context:
Historical documents, old tools and implements, and antique 
art objects are to be found in an overwhelming quantity and 
variety in local society throughout Japan. These documents are 
unparalleled throughout the world for their quality and quantity 
as a record of human activities in the early modern era.
The majority of these historical materials are held as the 
private property of either old families or local communities. 
With the increasing social fluidity of living patterns, 
local historical materials are being lost to posterity,3  and 
large-scale natural disasters further accelerate this loss of 
irreplaceable historical materials. In this mass disposal of 
wreckage and debris after disasters, historical materials 
abandoned inside condemned buildings are disposed as 
well. With the destruction of these materials, the history of 
the region that they contain is also forever lost to posterity. 
After Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995, people have 
become conscious of the need to preserve endangered 
historical materials, and many salvage operations have been 
conducted to preserve historical materials.
Miyagi Prefecture was hit by an epicentral earthquake on 
26th July 2003. This led to the formation of the ‘Miyagi 
Rekishi Shiryō Hozon Net’ (Miyagi Shiryō Net ‘MSN’) to 
provide an organizational structure to coordinate preparation 
work for saving historical materials in future disasters. 
3 OKUMURA Hiroshi Dai-shinsai to Rekishi Shiryō Hozon (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011)
Fig. 5.3 Old official documents of Ōkago Village, (early 19th century), 
             found in a private warehouse  (Ichinoseki City, Iwate Prefefcture, 
             Aug.8,2009)
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Before:
When MSN was founded in 2003, we knew that another 
large earthquake was certain to occur in the near future.4 
In preparation for this impending disaster, the MSN began 
to locate and digitally record materials in private hands 
throughout Miyagi Prefecture, in what we call ‘historical 
preservation activities.’5 Prior to March 2011, MSN had 
succeeded in conducting 415 such preservation operations.
After:
Many original historical materials were lost in the tsunami 
and earthquake of March 2011. However, there were several 
cases where MSN had recorded the lost originals with 
digital cameras beforehand. Moreover, the activities of MSN 
before the disaster had provided MSN with an interpersonal 
network linking together collection owners, interested 
local citizens, and local government officials. This existing 
network enabled MSN to quickly and efficiently react. As of 
December 2013, MSN has conducted salvage operations for 
78 collections of endangered historical materials. 
Good Practices:
In order to protect local historical materials from disasters, it 
is important to start preservation activities prior to the actual 
event. 
It is essential to locating and digitally record materials. This 
process also creates interpersonal networks which function as 
sources of information on endangered materials when regular 
communications are sundered. Involving ordinary citizens 
in these activities provides a source of skilled and informed 
manpower to supplement the limited resources of specialists.
Fig. 5.4 Salvage Operations of  Honma Family Historical Materials 
             (Ishinomaki city, Miyagi Prefecture, Apr.6,2011)
Problems:
Three years have passed since the events of 2011, but 
there is still no end in sight in the process of salvaging and 
preserving endangered and damaged historical materials. 
However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain 
funding and manpower for continuing operations.
Another problem we face is how to find a suitable keeping 
place for materials we have salvaged and preserved. There 
is a dearth of public storage facilities, and there are cases 
where we cannot return collections to their original owners.
Fig. 5.5 Emergency first aid treatment for damaged materials (Sendai City, 
             Miyagi Prefecture. July 11, 2013)
4 Miyagi Ken Oki Jishin no Chōki Hyōka’ 27th Nov. 2000 http://www.jishin.go.jp/main/chousa/00nov4_2/miyagi.htm
5  HIRAKA Arata (2005) ‘Shinsai”Go” no Shiryō Hozen kara Saigai “Mae” no Bōsai Taisaku he’ “Rekishi Hyōron” 666 55
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HFA Core Indicator 5.2:
Disaster preparedness plans and contingency 
plans are in place at all administrative levels, and 
regular training drills and rehearsals are held to 
test and develop disaster response programmes.
DMAT as the First and 
Long-lasting Responder34
Keywords:
DMAT, disaster base hospitals, training drills, coordinator 
program
Context:
September 1, the day in 1923 when the Great Kanto 
Earthquake devastated the Tokyo metropolitan area and 
killed 105,000 people, is designated as Disaster Drill 
Day. Based on experiences from the Great Hanshin 
Awaji Earthquake, a system of medical responder teams, 
called Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), was 
established in 2005 throughout the nation to provide rapid 
on-site confined space medicine, “Load-and-Go” and wide-
area transportation. The founding elements to support the 
activities of DMATs, i.e. Disaster Base Hospital (DBH), 
Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), Staging Care 
Unit (SCU) and wide-area transportation, Emergency 
Medical Information System (EMIS) and disaster medical-
public health coordinator were established as described in 
Core Indicator 5.1.
Before:
Under the management of the Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare, there are more than 1,000 DMATs, with a 
total of 6,000 members throughout Japan. The National 
Disaster Medical Center is assigned as the Headquarters 
(HQ) of the Japan DMATs. There are six fundamental 
HQ functions that make the DMAT activities possible: a) 
Planning and direction, b) Recording, c) Coordination, d) 
Intelligence and analysis, e) Tactics and command control, 
and f) Management of resources. A DMAT comprises 
one or two medical doctor(s), one or two nurse(s), one 
pharmacist and one logistician (4–5 people in total), and 
can access the affected site within 48 h with self-standing 
equipment, drugs, food and a vehicle. The concept of 
DMAT activities are defined as Command & Control, 
Safety, Communication, Assessment, Triage, Treatment 
and Transport (CSCATTT). It was strongly recognized that 
profound knowledge about disasters and preparedness is 
necessary to be a DMAT. There are also traditional medical 
relief teams (MRTs) of the Japan Medical Association, 
Public Hospitals, Japan Red Cross and others. These teams 
are designated to give medical care to the people in shelters, 
public health aid until the recovery of local health care 
providers.
Table 5.4  Difference between Japanese DMATs and other MRTs
1.  Preordered and legislative preparedness and agreement 
     with prefectures.
2.  Only educated and trained individuals are registered so 
     that the common languages make the coordinated action 
     possible.
3.  Collective and collaborative action is possible by the 
     coordination of HQ
4.  Abilities to coordinate with related organizations 
     especially with police and fire department
5.  Self-control of their own safety.
The DMAT Standard Textbook was first published in 
Feb. 2011 as a product of its 10-year training program. 
DMAT members are hospital workers with daily duties, 
but they will be dispatched and must take continuing 
education courses. DMAT leaders are certified after 
taking an advanced course and can assist the local HQ as 
coordinators. Every September 1, DMAT HQ organizes a 
simulation drill.
After:
DMATs are increasing to 1,300 as of April 2014. DMAT 
guidelines were modified to deal with the emerging 
problems associated with large-scale disasters. The concept 
of a prepared response is propagated to other MRTs 
including pediatric, psychiatric, primary care and other 
disaster-related medical-public health responders. The 
number of prefectures assigning medical-public health 
coordinators is increasing.
Good practices:
A total of 383 DMATs, 1,800 members, were rapidly 
dispatched to the affected area from March 11 to 18. DMATs 
provided medical aids, assisted the local HQ with medical-
public health coordinators, in addition to management of 
SCU and wide-area transportation of severely ill patients. 
DMATs utilized EMIS and the Medical Air Transport 
Tracking System (MATTS) as much as possible for efficient 
coordination. SCU became the source of substitute medical 
workers to reduce the load in the affected hospitals. DMATs 
conducted hospital evacuation of 507 patients from the 
restricted area near the nuclear power plant without any 
mortality.
Problems:
●  Responses were required for not only injuries and acute 
conditions, but also chronic illnesses and public health 
consequences.
●  The time gaps until the arrival of other MRTs or 
recovery of local health care providers were unexpectedly 
long, although the medical needs of those affected were 
increasing.
●  Some DMATs did not have the necessary tools 
to overcome the damage and congestion of the 
telecommunication systems.
●  EMIS was not fully utilized by multiple sectors including 
the government, fire departments and Self Defense Forces.
●  The number of DMAT leaders, medical-public health 
coordinators and supporting staff was insufficient to 
maintain effective HQ function.
●  Logistics to support DMATs were insufficient especially 
for food, drugs, medical resources and fuel.
●  The lack of prepared facilities for SCU and wide-area 
transportation, and the lack of wide-area transportation 
plans delayed the first flight.
●  The lack of general understanding of the function of 
DMATs by the health professions in the affected area 
made help requests and use of materials and human 
resources inefficient.
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HFA Core Indicator 5.3:
Financial reserves and contingency mechanisms 
are in place to support effective response and 
recovery when required.
Legal and Financial Frameworks 
for Recovery and Reconstruction
35
Keywords:
disaster recovery and reconstruction acts, Reconstruction 
Agency
Context:
As a disaster-prone country, Japan has a long history of 
recovery and reconstruction of major cities including the 
capital city Tokyo. Reconstruction has been necessary with 
recurrent disasters, including earthquakes, conflagrations, 
wars as well as other types of natural and manmade 
disasters.  However, the Japanese modern disaster 
management system based on the Disaster Management 
Countermeasures Basic Act (enacted in 1961) has no fixed 
system or framework for reconstruction, regardless of the 
many provisions for recovery.
Before:
The Headquarters for Reconstruction of the Hanshin/
Awaji Area, mandated for orchestrating recovery efforts, 
was set up about one month after the Great Hanshin-
Awaji Earthquake (January 1995) occurred, and was based 
on a new “Act for the Basic Principle and Organization 
for  Reconstruct ion af ter  the Great  Hansin/Awaji 




About three and a half months after the Great East Japan 
Earthquake (hereinafter GEJE), the Recovery Headquarters was 
set up based on the new act “the Basic Act of Reconstruction 
after the GEJE.” This was a similar situation to the post-Great 
Hanshin/Awaji Earthquake. Under this headquarters, the 
Reconstruction Design Council was organized to discuss the 
basic concept of reconstruction (See Figure 5.6).
The devastation of the Tohoku region further led to the 
creation of a new reconstruction agency for the third 
time in Japanese history, following the 1923 Great Kanto 
Earthquake and World War II. The Reconstruction Agency 
officially debuted on February 10, 2012, and is a 10-year 
operation reporting directly to the Cabinet. Created under 
“the Act Establishing the Reconstruction Agency”, this 
agency is primarily responsible for coordinating various 
ministries’ budgetary and reconstruction procedures so 
that reconstruction efforts in all localities can proceed in a 
timely manner.
New System for Reconstruction after the GEJE7 
The Special Area for Reconstruction: In these areas, 
advanced medical and welfare services, deregulation 
of emergent temporary buildings, special taxation 
arrangements for capital investment, interest subsidies for 
loans, etc. has been executed.
The Reconstruction Support Grant System: From March 
2012 to March 2013, 1,937 billion yen (national funds: 1,570 
billion yen) were issued for seven prefectures and 94 cities, 
towns and villages. Use of this grant was highly flexible 
compared to previous grants.
The Liquidation-type Revival Fund: Introduced to nine 
prefectures, the total amount of 196 billion yen is for filling 
the gap between existing support systems and establishing 
flexible arrangements for victims. It was increased by 104.7 
billion yen for inhabitants of the tsunami disaster area.
New Legal Framework
In June 2013, the Diet passed “the Act Concerning 
Reconstruction after Major Disasters”, and coincided with 
the amendment of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic 
Act. The aim of this new act is to prepare the governmental 
framework for quick reconstruction after major disasters. 
The main contents are:8 
-Set up of the Headquarters for Reconstruction: The Prime 
Minister can set up a headquarters in the Cabinet Office at 
the time of a major disaster. No new act is necessary for 
setting this up.
- Formulate the Reconstruction Basic Principle
- Draw up the Reconstruction Plan: Prefectural governments 
can draw up the Prefecture Reconstruction Principle. The 
plans will include restructuring of land use for smooth and 
quick reconstruction and so on.
- Special Arrangement for the Reconstruction Plans: 1) 
change of the Land Use Plan in a one-stop manner, 2) 
relaxation of the authorization for reconstruction projects, 
3) city planning for of reconstruction will be applied.
- The central government’s execution of disaster recovery 
project instead of local governments: Such as fishery ports, 
roads, coastal protection facilities and rivers for which the 
local government are responsible in ordinary times.
- Special finance arrangement: When a major disaster 
occurs, the government will execute special finance 
arrangements quickly by enacting other new acts, if it is 
recognized as being specifically necessary.
Source: Modified from Iuchi, K., Johnson, A., and Olshansky, R (2013) 6
Fig. 5.6 Evolution of Japan’s Recovery Governance Structure
6 Source: Iuchi, K., Johnson, L. A., & Olshansky, R. B. (2013). Securing Tohoku’s future: Planning for rebuilding in the first year following the Tohoku-oki earthquake and 
  tsunami. Earthquake Spectra,
7  Source: Cabinet Office “White Paper on Disaster Management, Fiscal Year 2013”
8  Source: Materials explaining the Act Concerning Reconstruction after Major Disasters, the Cabinet Office. 57
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HFA Core Indicator 5.3:
Financial reserves and contingency mechanisms 
are in place to support effective response and 
recovery when required.
Preparedness for Low-frequency 




disaster response preparedness, medical assistance, public 
health, clinical data
Context:
After the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, Japan enhanced its 
disaster management mechanism, especially in the medical-
assistance field. However, the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Tsunami raised the issue of the need for 
further enhancement in both short- and long-term medical 
services provision in a disaster situation, including public 
health issues.
Before:
Japan’s disaster response and management have been 
regulated by the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, 
which was enacted after Typhoon Isewan in 1959. The Act 
specifies that municipalities and/or prefectures are responsible 
for developing a regional disaster risk reduction plan, along 
with the Basic Disaster Prevention Plan, and for responding 
to disasters. However, the Act was developed without 
the expectation of a largescale disaster such as the 2011 
Tsunami, with damages and impacts beyond the management 
capacity of prefectures and municipalities. Based on the 
experiences of the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, the disaster 
base hospitals and Disaster Medical Assistance Teams 
(DMATs) were established to minimize casualties under 
disaster conditions, and a wide-area medical transportation 
system and Emergency Medical Information System (EMIS) 
were developed to share clinical and logistics information 
between the related hospitals and the government. At 
the time of the Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake in 2007, whose 
damage occurred within a limited area, the disaster medical 
response was successfully implemented immediately after 
the event and provided effective assistance by transporting 
the seriously injured to a disaster base hospital. In addition, 
since 2008, EMIS has been established in most prefectures 
and municipalities, 603 disaster base hospitals have been 
constructed, 1,000 DMATs have been formed and 6,000 
DMAT members have been trained.
During:
More than 15,000 people were killed by the 2011 tsunami, 
and more than 2,600 people are still consider missing. The 
cause of more than 90% of the deaths was drowning, which 
was completely different from the case of the Hanshin-
Awaji Earthquake, wherein the major cause was crushing by 
building collapse. A large number of patients suffered from 
aggravation of chronic diseases because of the short supply 
of medicines and a lack of clinical information. Ishinomaki 
City was severely affected by the Tsunami. In the City, 
several hospitals located along the coast areas were forced 
to evacuate. Only the Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital, which 
had just moved inland prior to the 2011 Tsunami, could 
remain functioning and played a central role in disaster 
medicine at the frontline as a disaster base hospital.
In most affected areas, wide-area medical transportation 
was required for dialysis and other treatments. One 
characteristic of such a massive disaster is creating a much 
wider variety of medical needs, not only at hospitals but 
also at evacuation centers and homes.
After:
●  Based on the 2011 tsunami, the existing law was 
modified to enable prefectures to provide the necessary 
support to municipalities for their own initiatives.
●  DMATs were empowered to provide short-term, middle-
term, and long-term medical assistance.
●  The Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act was modified 
and specified that municipalities must create a list of 
people requiring special and additional assistance during 
emergencies.
●  Creation of a manual for public health in emergency 
situations has been discussed and coordinated in a 
series of meetings organized by relevant organizations, 
agencies, and groups to unify the medical information in 
disaster situations.
●  Efforts to enhance public health, medicine, and social 
welfare in emergency situations have been undertaken 
at different levels, including the establishment of 
specialized medical teams to respond to radiation 
disasters; developing psychosocial care teams, such 
as the psychological first aid promoted by WHO; 
and initiating a lecture series for disaster medical 
coordinators to train them to respond effectively to large-
scale disasters.
●  A national project was launched to back up clinical 
information among national and public university 
hospitals. Various local projects were also launched to 
share clinical data as a backup.
Good practices:
Practices developed after the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake
●  Several medical teams, including DMATs, hastened 
to provide medical services at evacuation centers in 
the affected sites and provided assistance for hospital 
evacuations.
●  Initiatives adapted after the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake 
were implemented at the time of the 2011 tsunami, 
including the operation of disaster base hospitals, 
psychosocial support teams, networks for dialysis, EMIS, 
and a wide-area medical transportation system.
Disaster medical coordinator
●  Under the leadership of the prefecture and municipality-
level coordinators, collaboration and cooperation 
between public and private sectors including the Japan 
Self-Defense Forces and DMATs were strengthened. The 
coordinators played an important role in many efforts, 
including autopsying victims, requesting accommodation 
for injured people, and disaster medical team deployment 
after the sub-acute phase.
University hospital
●  The university hospitals located in three affected 
prefectures played crucial roles as disaster base hospitals 
in providing support to the local hospitals, receiving 
patients, assisting with wide-area medical transportation 
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for dialysis, and collaborating with prefecture-level 
disaster medical coordinators.
●  They provided and provisioned the required medical 
personnel such as doctors, nurses, and pharmacists to the 
hospitals and medical facilities in the affected areas.
Activities at evacuation centers
●  Based on the experiences and the lessons learned from 
the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, there was a concern 
about the increasing number of patients suffering from 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression 
and alcoholism. However, with active intervention by 
psychosocial teams, the occurrence of these symptoms 
was minimized.
Relocation of hospitals to higher grounds and hills
●  The Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital, which had just 
moved to higher ground prior to the 2011 tsunami, 
played a central role as a disaster base hospital.
Problems:
Preparedness and measures against massive tsunamis
●  Earthquakes had been the main focus of existing 
measures. Following the 2011 tsunami, many needs 
emerged that had not been seen during the 1995 Great 
Kobe Earthquake and were thus factored into the 
required response.
●  There were insufficient preparations and countermeasures 
for handling both the interruption of regional public 
health systems and other serious damage.
●  It was extremely difficult to obtain information on the 
situation and the needs of expectant mothers, infants, 
elderly persons, persons with disabilities, and foreigners 
who require extra support and assistance.
●  The medical records in hospitals around the tsunami area 
were lost or completely destroyed. The electronic 
medical records were temporally unavailable because of 
power outages.
●  Hospital damage included not only the buildings and 
equipment, but also loss of human resources and medical 
personnel, requiring hospital evacuation.
Disaster public health
●  When a large-scale disaster occurs, the functions of the
municipal-level disaster countermeasures offices 
and those of the prefecture and municipality public 
health centers cease. The current policies and laws 
do not clearly state how the national and prefectural 
governments can assist these offices with the medical 
response in such situations, nor do they provide planning 
tools or guidelines.
●  After the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, the calculation 
of “disasters=DMAT=external injuries” was widely 
acknowledged, and there was no concept of “disaster 
public health risk management.” Even the Disaster Relief 
Act did not target activities related to public health, 
sanitation, nutrition and welfare. Therefore, the adoption 
of public health measures for welfare and nutrition, 
relief activities for persons requiring extra support, and 
infection control were delayed.
●  The absence of a comprehensive/holistic control and 
coordination mechanism delayed the establishment of 
the relief system. The interruption of communication 
and information sharing and the severe damage in the 
affected areas hampered medical relief activities at 
evacuation centers.
Preparation of receiving support
●  The affected hospitals were not sufficiently prepared 
for receiving and managing assistance from external 
organizations effectively, although they were familiar 
with providing medical assistance. There was no clear 
guideline describing the mechanism of receiving 
support, such as how the affected hospitals can request 
assistance over a wide area.
Relief supply
●  The stockpile of emergency supplies was insufficient 
because it had been prepared under the assumption 
that the lifeline could be secured from private power 
generation and well water use facilities.
●  It was impossible to respond to the affected areas’ 
requests immediately because of insufficient manpower 
and equipment.
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HFA Core Indicator 5.4:
Procedures are in place to exchange relevant 
information during hazard events and disasters, 
and to undertake post-event reviews.
Prospect of Future Information 
Exchange Methods in the Event of a 
Disaster by Taking Advantage of SNS
37
Keywords:
mass media, social network service (SNS), Twitter, risk 
communication
Context:
In the past two decades,  there were two greatest 
earthquakes, in 1995 and 2011. During this period, the 
methods of delivering and sharing disaster information to 
the public have changed considerably. In 1995, the most 
widely used form of communication was newspapers and 
TV, whereas in 2011, Internet social network service (SNS) 
such as Facebook and Twitter were used. SNS have figured 
prominently as an instant info-sharing cybertool, despite 
the presence of ethical and privacy issues for individual 
account holders. As a future goal, methods to respect and 
protect SNS account users should be implemented, while 
maximizing the instant info-sharing potential of SNS.
Before:
When the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake occurred, TV and 
newspapers were the main source of sharing information. 
Immediately after the disaster, these media conveyed 
the damage situation. It remained difficult to obtain 
information regarding damage conditions in the early 
stages. Over time, the information contents changed to 
the victim’s perspective such as sharing information about 
shelter locations, their conditions, and confirming people’s 
whereabouts. With time, the relevance of information 
contents changed for victims’ long-term living environment 
in evacuation facility such as life lines, preventing second 
disasters, medical services, and school re-opening. The 
origin of the information was mainly the government, 
and mass media delivered it to the public. However, there 
was a lot of incorrect information or rumors around. The 
mass media also had ethical issues; for example, the roar 
of broadcasting company helicopters reporting on damage 
conditions, such as destroyed buildings or roads, caused 
search-and-rescue crews difficulty in hearing the voices of 
victims who were underground or in collapsed buildings. 
Moreover, those mass media concentrated on areas of 
massive or shocking events. Thus, it is difficult to say 
that they provided sufficient information about rescuing 
outcomes and emergency treatments. Community radio and 
news programs for people with disabilities and foreigners 
have earned positive reviews. At that time, the Internet 
had just begun to spread widely, and it was considered the 
first full-scale media attention devoted to a disaster. One of 
online communication network, Nifty Serve, has launched 
an earthquake information hub and provided diverse 
information on administration, shelter, and volunteer 
activities. However, much of the information had previously 
been announced by the government, and in other cases, 
concerns existed about the information’s reliability because 
of its origin.
After:
Using a wide range of mass media, including the Internet 
(SNS), for exchanging disaster information during the 
2011 Earthquake and Tsunami was novel. The huge 
tsunami, with more than 10 m waves, followed a magnitude 
9.0 earthquake and reached an elevation of 40.1 m, 
catastrophically damaging the Japanese Pacific coastal 
area. TV and radio announced warning information such as 
aftershocks and the second and third waves of the Tsunami. 
After the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, they also 
announced evacuation information by removal order and 
the radiation diffusion of contamination areas. Media also 
reported in detail on the rescue activities by the Japan Self-
Defense Forces (JSDF) and experts from abroad. It informed 
the public about the damage from liquefaction to the coastal 
areas in Chiba Prefecture, and train and bus schedules for 
commuters in the central Tokyo area. NHK and certain 
commercial television stations provided real-time disaster-
related information via their websites to people who could 
not watch TV due to power outage9 and so on. According 
to the result of a survey of 100 companies in the Kanto 
area, the percentage of the purpose of SNS usage including 
Facebook and Twitter in April 2011 (immediately following 
the disaster) increased: the percentage for communicating 
with family and friends before the disaster and for receiving 
early information after the disaster rose from 32% to 49%, 
for supplying media report but with lack of information by 
TV and newspaper rose from 20% to 33%, for informing to 
large numbers of people rose from 22% to 29%. Receiving 
domestic and international information from mass media 
ranked fourth (22%), and confirming family members’ and 
friends’ whereabouts and safety occupied 21% of SNS 
usage. Public information could be obtained via SNS10, but 
they can also transfer private information. In addition to 
affecting a wide area, the Great East Japan Earthquake and 
large-scale Tsunami caused the Fukushima nuclear plant 
accident and subsequent secondary disasters. Therefore, it 
is increasingly thought that a Nankai Trough Earthquake 
has a high probability of occurrence, and discussion has 
begun addressing it as a real and practical matter. Regarding 
the effects of a large-scale earthquake in a big city, the 
2011 disaster triggered broad perspective discussions on 
TV forums about disaster prevention and relief among 
individual, academic, industrial, and government experts. 
In 2011, smartphones also played an important role. 
Despite a phone charging problem due to power outage or 
communication towers being broken, many people sent real-
time messages/news of affected areas using SNS through 
smartphones.
Good practices:
By tying up with NHK, certain commercial television 
stations and internet sites provided Nico-Nico movie news 
and Ustream for people with disabilities and those unable 
to watch TV because of the power outage. Yahoo Japan 
9  The Cabinet Office (2011). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h23/bousai2011/html/honbun/2b_sanko_siryo_06.htm.
10  The Cabinet Office (2012). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hisaisyagyousei/youengosya/h24_kentoukai.60
and Google Japan launched a real-time disaster-related 
information site and a people’s whereabouts information 
site, respectively. 
Moreover, people using SNS exchanged considerable 
information. For example, fuel for cars or house heating 
systems was not delivered to the affected areas, including 
lightly affected areas, because of a malfunction of the 
logistics system. Twitter users frequently shared information 
via Twitter about the available gas stations. Twitter 
messages also shared information on when aid and medical 
supplies were not delivered on time, requesting the rescue 
supplies, and people’s emotions, such as anxiety for the 
aftershocks and fears about cold temperatures. Information 
on volunteer activities and people’s whereabouts was also 
shared via SNS. SNS played an especially important role 
for foreigners who did not understand Japanese, sharing 
real-time information in their native language. 
Problems:
In virtual online space such as SNS, the first uploader’s 
opinion on the information occasionally has more 
powerful influence, for better or worse. The point is that 
a vast amount of information is spread to public with no 
verification, which could cause chaos.
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Future Recommendations for Post Hyogo Framework for Action
HFA Priority for Action 1:
Ensure that disaster risk reduction 
is a national and a local priority 
with a strong institutional basis for 
implementation.
HFA Core Indicator 1.1:
National policy and legal frameworks for disaster risk 
reduction exist and include decentralized responsibilities 
and capacities at all levels.
● Japan’s history of institutionalizing a disaster 
management system highlights three key points.First, 
national level leadership in establishing a disaster 
management system helps to organize horizontal 
and vertical structures effectively. Second, creating 
a law to implement a disaster management system 
will further legitimize the system and thus support 
further actions. Third, shaping an institutional basis in 
which all levels of organizations — national, regional, 
and local participate. All these actions will take 
considerable time, but initiating a system and revising 
it as necessary through post-disaster assessments is 
critical for improving disaster management. 
● Various national recovery agencies have been 
established after large-scale disasters worldwide.
In many cases, such agencies are only created for an 
interim period, usually between five and ten years, 
their responsibility and power in recovery are critical. 
As these agencies often set the stage for long-term 
rebuilding and future resilience, identifying funding 
and allocating decision-making power within the 
existing relationship of ministries and departments 
(e.g., public works, building construction, social 
welfare, and health) prior to large-scale disasters are 
extremely important for effective implementation 
of recovery. As in the case of post-GEJE in Japan, 
starting a new agency outside existing regulatory 
framework is not an easy task, as it often causes 
confusion and disorder delaying the recovery effort.
single-government financial security and liability 
are declining, preparing mutual support networks 
between various players in society is crucial. Such 
networks include supporting structures among local, 
prefectural, regional, and national governments, where 
financial obligations are a non-primary concern. The 
participation of citizens as well as private sector 
entities in this in-kind system is also essential, as 
disaster size and degree are unforeseeable.
University Faculty as a Non-Governmental Resource to 
Support Disaster Risk Reduction in Recovery Planning 
with Local Government
4
Importance of Quantitative Assessment of 
Uncertainties and their Visualization in Tsunami 
Hazard Assessment
8
Tsunami Fragility Curves for Supporting 
Reconstruction and Future Risk Assessment9
HFA Core Indicator 2.1: 
National policy and local risk assessments based on hazard 
data and vulnerability information are available and include 
risk assessments for key sectors.
● Local governments and experts should build 
relationships of trust during non-disaster periods. 
● Experts should support the local governments 
as a team, which makes it possible to respond 
comprehensively and complementarily.
● Experts should connect the local government and the 
local community.
● We need to qualitatively assess the uncertainties 
of the tsunami hazard assessment and visualize 
comprehensibly the uncertainties in the tsunami 
hazard map. By visualizing the uncertainties, 
people can clearly perceive that the tsunami hazard 
assessment includes large uncertainties. Moreover, 
clearly showing regional characteristics of the 
uncertainties could benefit residents who live in 
coastal areas.
● Characterizing tsunami fragility curves in different 
tsunami hazards, geographic, and social conditions so 
that they can be used as universal measure of tsunami 
risk assessment.
● Tsunami fragility curves should be updated and 
implemented for use in terms of risk assessment of 
reconstruction and urban planning in national, local 
and community levels.
HFA Priority for Action 2:
Identify, assess and monitor disaster 
risks and enhance early warning.
National Policy and Legal Frameworks for Disaster 
Risk Reduction1
● In-kind support systems are becoming increasingly 
important. As we exist in an insecure world, where 
vulnerabilities to disasters are increasing and 
Dedicated and Adequate Resources for Disaster 
Management in Japan3
HFA Core Indicator 1.2:
Dedicated and adequate resources are available to 
implement disaster risk reduction activities at all 
administrative levels.
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Earthquake Early Warning System in Schools and at a 
University during the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake11
Monitoring of Land Slides and Status of Buildings and 
Construction Areas by Radar Technology12
Information Sharing, Cooperation, and Expert Training 
Provided by Academic Research Institutes for Natural 
Disasters
13
Education to Build a Culture of Safety and Resilience 
at All Levels around Academic Research Institutes14
HFA Core Indicator 2.3:
Early warning systems are in place for all major hazards, 
with outreach to communities.
HFA Core Indicator 3.1:
Relevant information on disasters is available and accessible 
at all levels, to all stakeholders (through networks, 
development of information sharing systems, etc.)
HFA Core Indicator 3.2:
School curricula, education material and relevant 
training include disaster risk reduction and recovery 
concepts and practices.
● EEW reduces the number of causalities by providing 
information for both physical and mechanical reactions. 
Based on experiences from the Tohoku earthquake, 
successful utilization in schools is important to enhance 
the social understanding for EEW. EEWS will be 
installed in all schools in the future.
● To avoid false alarms, EEWS should be reliable, and 
applicability to inland earthquakes would be enhanced 
by combining on-site earthquake observation data.
● Accurate ground motion estimation  is needed. 
Successive use of observation data from not only on-
site but also from local/regional observation networks 
is recommended. Front-site observation data could be 
efficiently used to enhance the accuracy.
● GB-SAR systems should be tested under various 
conditions. At the beginning, experts must support 
assist with the analysis of GB-SAR data.
● A protocol for providing the early warning 
information through local governments must be 
established.
● Education about disaster prevention for non-experts 
is very important. We learned from the Great East 
Japan Earthquake that it is effective to teach people 
the preconditions of hazard estimation. During the 
emergency, people themselves had to decide how to 
avoid hazards and protect property because of the 
inadequate information from outside their community. 
HFA Priority for Action 3:
Use knowledge, innovation and 
education to build a culture of safety 
and resilience at all levels.
Education Practice Program for Improving Response 
Capability to Survive a Tsunami15
● Disaster risk reduction education including lessons 
from the 2011 disaster that judgment by themselves on 
the situation save the lives should be implemented at 
all grade levels to increase the disaster awareness of 
children.
● New types of practical education tools should be 
developed to further interest children, including tools 
that can be used outside the classroom.
● The establishment of a domestic system for local 
hazard risk is the highest priority effort, comprising 
an observation system, a system for archiving and 
extracting data, expert training, and other elements. 
The establishment of an integrated knowledge system 
is the next priority. 
Development of the Reconstruction Mapping Program 
at the Tsunami-affected Elementary School16
In order for disaster education to further contribute 
to building a culture of safety and resilience in the 
community, 
● disaster education should be developed by fully 
reflecting the local context, including the community’s 
disaster history, natural environments, and social and 
economic backgrounds; and
● the validity of each disaster education program should 
be examined for sharing effective approaches.
International Post-graduate Education Program 
for Disaster Medicine; Collaboration with Tohoku 
University Human Security Program
17
● Disaster medicine is an interdisciplinary subject. An 
interdisciplinary course such as Tohoku University’s 
Human Security Program is suitable for implementing 
subjects related to the study of disasters. The 
international educational program is suitable for 
international students to learn lessons from the GEJET.
However, students in the international program have 
few opportunities to learn from local people, so the 
organizer of the course should consider providing 








HFA Priority for Action 4:
Reduce the underlying risk factors.
HFA Core Indicator 4.1:
Disaster risk reduction is an integral objective of 
environment-related policies and plans, including for 
land use, natural resource management and adaptation 
to climate change.
HFA Core Indicator 4.2:
Social development policies and plans are being 
implemented to reduce the vulnerability of populations 
most at risk.
HFA Core Indicator 4.4:
Planning and management of human settlements 
incorporate disaster risk reduction elements, including 
enforcement of building codes.
HFA Core Indicator 4.5:
Disaster risk reduction measures are integrated with 
post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes.
Post-tsunami Recovery Strategies in Sanriku Coastal 
Areas after the 1933 Tsunami
● Relocation to higher land from the waterfront area as 
a post-tsunami recovery strategy should be performed by 
national/local government purchase of the lowlands to 
avoid future private usage of vulnerable waterfront space.
Measures for People Requiring Assistance 
during a Disaster
● More thorough business operation analysis should be 
performed to devise BCPs including the network 
required for maintaining the supply chain. 
Disruption of Supply and Supply Chain Management
● Efforts should be made toward knowing about 
suppliers that make up the supply chain. Companies 
should become aware that centralized purchasing to 
reduce cost and sticking to original specifications 
make it difficult to resort to alternate procurement.
20 Integrated Perspective of Civil Engineering, Architecture and Urban Planning
After the disaster, a number of projects are under 
way simultaneously; however, each of them has to be 
coordinated to comprise entire future vision of a village.
● Multidisciplinary cooperation among various experts; 
architect, a civil engineer or an urban planner, with 
locals, is important to build up a project.
● Sharing future vision of the village among the people 
prior to their opinion survey works well to lead their 
intentions to an appropriate direction.
● To build up consensus for the village planning, the 
complementary communication with local stakeholders 
is invaluable.
Promotion of the Earthquake-proof Retrofit of 
Buildings after the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake
● Pre-disaster recovery planning worked well in Kobe’s 
Mano District after the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake as 
well as in Tokyo after the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake. 
Pre-disaster recovery planning is an important process 
for reaching agreement among the local government 
and residents on a future vision of the district.  Sharing 
the future vision prior to a disaster may avoid emotional 
conflicts at the stages of developing or implementing 
the post-disaster recovery plan.
Public Housing for the Mitigation on the Negative 
Impact of Environmental Transition on the Victims
To avoid degradation of the community caused by 
long-term stays in temporary housing and drastic 
changes in living conditions:
● The new housing community should be 
interconnected with the existing community.
● The new living environment should encourage 
residents’ communication, especially to prevent the 
isolation of older persons, who represent a large 
number of the residents.
● Sharing sufficient information concerning the 
reconstruction plan and allowing the public to 
participate in the planning of the housing are 
essential.
Post-tsunami Recovery for Risk Reduction after the 
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
● Prediction of available resources as well as disaster 
damage is necessary for implementing 
reconstruction activities. Reconstruction activity 
estimation should be considered at the national, 
local, and community levels corresponding to 
predicted damage levels.
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HFA Core Indicator 4.3:
Economic and productive sectoral policies and plans 
have been implemented to reduce the vulnerability of 
economic activities.
Enhancement of Business Continuity Plans and 
Business Continuity Management
● All organizations including companies are 
recommended to develop its BCP, and the governments 
should make efforts to diffuse BCPs. Furthermore, 
BCPs should be prepared in anticipation of severe 
incidents that require “alternative strategies”, including 
a substitute business site.
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HFA Priority for Action 5:
Strengthen disaster preparedness for 
effective response at all levels.
HFA Core Indicator 5.1:
Strong policy, technical and institutional capacities 
and mechanisms for disaster risk management, with a 
disaster risk reduction perspective, are in place.
Measures and Agenda for Large-scale Disasters in 
Japan: from the Perspective of Personal Information 
and Disaster Prevention Education
● It is important to establish legislation for responding 
to large-scale disasters and re-establishing the 
network among residents in the municipalities and 
lower levels.
● One goal is to develop an information-sharing 
system by reviewing how personal information 
may be excessively protected, and by creating a 
database with detail, a management strategy, and the 
system’s application under the regulation, through 
cooperation among residents, local governments, 
and the national government.
●The other goal is to share and hand down local 
knowledge, including disaster information. To 
accomplish sharing and handing down requires 
encouraging citizens to perform daily activities 
positively for their local community and embedding 
activities that increase safety awareness and 
disaster relief (local knowledge), which can reduce 
community vulnerability to disaster.
National Preparedness of Disaster Medicine as 
Tertiary Risk Reduction30
● DBHs should build capacities to deal with chemical, 
biological, radioactive, nuclear and explosive 
(CBRNE) hazards.
● Utilization of SCU as the hub of medical resources 
should be better prepared.
● Daily usage of EMIS as a medical management system 
in the community will increase the coverage of 
hospitals and health-related institutions.
● Assignment of medical-public health coordinators 
together with education and supporting resources is 
necessary.
● Disaster risk assessment and reinforcement of risk 
reduction of all hospitals as “the building last standing 
in a disaster” are necessary.
● National standardization of DBHs and hospitals as 
evacuation shelters is necessary
● Strengthening of emergency lifelines together with 
hospital resource stocks including drugs, food, medical 
gases should be considered as a BCP.
● The medical relief to the affected hospital should 
comprise substitute workers rather than assistance 
for decreasing the physical and mental load of local 
workers who were also victims of the disaster.
● Communication tools including network infrastructures 
and satellite phones should be strengthened to make 
the hospitals more functional.
● Hospitals should build capacities to receive support 
by hiring disaster manager and disaster medical-public 
health coordinator.
● Health care at the evacuation center should be 
continuously supported by DMATs and other medical 
assistant teams to prevent the outbreak of infectious 
disease, mental depression, deep vein thrombosis and 
other diseases.
Enhancement of Plans for Operational Continuity of 
Government31
Three Coastal Districts in Iwaki City, Fukushima 
Prefecture: Differences Resulting from the Local 
Residents Organization Disaster Response Activities
32
HFA Core Indicator 5.2:
Disaster preparedness plans and contingency plans are 
in place at all administrative levels, and regular training 
drills and rehearsals are held to test and develop disaster 
response programmes.
● As the countermeasures required of local 
municipalities (counties and cities) are only to present 
an outline, voluntary, autonomous communication (such 
as hazard mapping) at the community level is very 
important for the plan to be effective. Specifically, a 
disaster prevention and mitigation system in accordance 
with the historical path dependency of each district 
is required. Examples include spatial hierarchy such 
as district － block association － neighborhood 
association (A) and district － neighborhood association 
(B, C); various forms of governing such as top-down 
decision-making (A) and combination of bottom-up 
decision-making and roles by officers (B, C).
● Community development and enhancement of 
the activities of resident organizations is one key to 
achieving these goals.
● Operational continuity of the ministries and local 
authorities (BCPs of public organizations) is essential 
for quick rescue action, to support refugees and to 
recover facilities and towns, even if these organizations 
suffer serious damage to their critical resources for 
important operations. It is strongly recommended 
that the plans have an alternative strategy for critical 
resources including their main buildings.
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Pre-Disaster Activities to Preserve Historical Materials 




HFA Core Indicator 5.3:
Financial reserves and contingency mechanisms are in place 
to support effective response and recovery when required.
● It is necessary to bring together owners of local 
collections, interested local citizens, local government 
employees and specialists on a continuing basis to 
build a consensus that there is a real need to protect 
historical materials from disasters.
● Disasters are not the only cause of attrition of 
historical materials. Social isolation and aging is 
another major threat, and it is important build social 
bonds to provide latent social support within local 
society for private owners of collections of historical 
materials.
DMAT as the First and Long-lasting Responder
● The concept of DMATs should be developed by each 
country considering their geographical, climate, 
cultural and socioeconomical characteristics.
● DMATs should be endorsed by the central government 
as effective medical-public health responders together 
with sufficient logistics support.
● The concepts of DBH, EMIS, SCU, wide-area 
transportation and medical-public health coordinators 
should be propagated as the fundamental structure for 
the activities of DMATs.
● DMATs should be trained for primary care of patients 
under various conditions, including CBRNE disasters 
together with confined space medicine, “Load-and-Go” 
and wide-area transportation, as specialists of disaster 
medicine.
● Continuous dispatch or logistics support should be pre-
planned to fulfill any gap until the arrival of other 
MRTs and recovery of local health care providers.
● Regular training of DMATs should be endorsed and 
assured by the government and affiliated hospitals to 
maintain the preparedness of DMATs.
Legal and Financial Frameworks for Recovery and 
Reconstruction
● Creating financial mechanisms that allow flexible 
use is essential for a recovery reflecting local needs. 
After the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake and 
Chuetsu Earthquake, foundations to manage and 
operate pooled recovery funds were established. 
After the GEJE, recovery funds were also pooled 
to be managed directly by the affected Prefectural 
governments. Pooling these funds and providing 
power to foundations and Prefectures to manage these 
funds better accommodates the needs of localities, 
which could incorporate multiple stakeholders and 
use the funds for various non-structural programs. 
Nevertheless, such mechanisms would need to be 
altered according to macro socio-economic conditions 
of that time.
Preparedness for Low-frequency and High-impact 
Disasters from a Medical Perspective
● Relocation to higher land from the waterfront area as a 
post-tsunami recovery strategy should be performed by 
national/local government purchase of the lowlands to 
avoid future private usage of vulnerable waterfront space.
● More thorough business operation analysis should 
be performed to devise BCPs including the network 
required for maintaining the supply chain.
● Reinforcement of buildings is essential to reduce the 
risk of collapse. Setting quantitative goals and 
education figure strongly in promoting this effort.
● Pre-disaster recovery planning worked well in 
Tokyo after the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake as well 
as in Kobe’s Mano District after the 1995 Great Kobe 
● Multilayered information sharing should be prepared, 
including EMIS, by every responder.
● Every hospital and medical professional should learn 
about the function of DMATs to enhance the support-
receiving capacities. Disaster medicine should be 
part of the curriculum for every medical and public 
health school as fundamental knowledge to cope with 
emergencies and disasters.
● Multi-sectorial collaborative preparedness should 
be established between DMATs and other responders 
through agreements.
● Every prefecture or province should strengthen the 
function of airports or other facilities for SCU to 
support DMATs for efficient wide-area transportation 
and to become a logistics hub for relieving resources 
and medical professionals.
● It is important to develop new and innovative ways of 
engaging freely interested citizens in this preservation 
process, and developing social structures to implement 
this. It is also necessary for national and local 
governments to start to study ways of supporting and 
promoting these kinds of activities. 
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HFA Core Indicator 5.4:
Procedures are in place to exchange relevant information 
during hazard events and disasters, and to undertake 
post-event reviews.
Prospect of Future Information Exchange Methods in 
the Event of a Disaster by Taking Advantage of SNS
● Figures depict Twitter account classification 
by the keywords “Great East Japan Earthquake” 
for August 30th and “Tsunami” for September 4th, 
2013, respectively. The total number of accounts 
for “Great East Japan Earthquake” was 1,165 and 
that for “Tsunami” was 797. Uploading messages 
and providing information regarding the earthquake 
by individual occupied 52% of the total accounts, 
suggesting a project by individuals or communities 
occupying 19% by the keyword “Great East Japan 
Earthquake.” The keyword “Tsunami” occupied 
46% of uploads from individual accounts and 20% 
from municipalities managing the account. This 
phenomenon can be interpreted as demonstrating the 
power of individuals sharing information via SNS 
and proving SNS to be the most effective method for 
sharing/exchanging information, anytime and anyplace.
● As another point, personal information such as bank 
account, tax, or health information that are stored by 
municipalities must be digitized and backup data kept 
in a secure place, safe from natural disasters. In the big 
data era, legal restrictions must be created as a filter 
ensuring the high quality and quantity of data, analysis 
methodology, and method of interpretation. Early 
ethical education for sharing information via SNS 
is also required. Risk-related communication using 
traditional multimedia, SNS, and WebGIS techniques 
can figure more importantly as next-generation 
communication methods.
Earthquake. Pre-disaster recovery planning is an 
important process for reaching an agreement among the 
local government and residents on a future vision of the 
district. Sharing the future vision prior to a disaster may 
avoid emotional conflicts at the stages of developing or 
implementing the post-disaster recovery plan.
● Prediction of available resources as well as disaster 
damage is necessary for implementing reconstruction 
activities. Reconstruction activities should be 
estimated at the national, local, and community levels 
and correspond to predicted damage levels.
● Clinical information in hospitals should be backed up, 
and comprehension of medical activity typical to the 
local area should be required.
Classification of Twitter Accounts by Keyword “Great East Japan 
Earthquake”
Classification of Twitter Accounts by Keyword “Tsunami”
*Since the keyword was searched in Japanese, it is possible that 
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